Novum organon renovatum: Being the second part of the philosophy of the inductive sciencesWhewell, William
Philosophy
Novum organon renovatum: Being the second part of the philosophy of the inductive sciences
Whewell, William
Science -- Philosophy
13. The last two sections of this chapter direct our attention to
two circumstances, which tend to prove, in a manner which we may
term irresistible, the truth of the theories which they
characterize:--the _Consilience of Inductions_ from different and
separate classes of facts;--and the progressive _Simplification of
the Theory_ as it is extended to new cases. These two Characters
are, in fact, hardly different; they are exemplified by the same
cases. For if these Inductions, collected from one class of facts,
supply an unexpected explanation of a new class, which is the case
first spoken of, there will be no need for new machinery in the
hypothesis to apply it to the newly-contemplated facts; and thus, we
have a case in which the system does not become {96} more complex
when its application is extended to a wider field, which was the
character of true theory in its second aspect. The Consiliences of
our Inductions give rise to a constant Convergence of our Theory
towards Simplicity and Unity.
But, moreover, both these cases of the extension of the theory,
without difficulty or new suppositions, to a wider range and to new
classes of phenomena, may be conveniently considered in yet another
point of view; namely, as successive steps by which we gradually
ascend in our speculative views to a higher and higher point of
generality. For when the theory, either by the concurrence of two
indications, or by an extension without complication, has included a
new range of phenomena, we have, in fact, a new induction of a more
general kind, to which the inductions formerly obtained are
subordinate, as particular cases to a general proposition. We have
in such examples, in short, an instance of _successive
generalization_. This is a subject of great importance, and
deserving of being well illustrated; it will come under our notice
in the next chapter.
{{97}}
CHAPTER VI.
OF THE LOGIC OF INDUCTION.
APHORISM XVII.
_The_ Logic of Induction _consists in stating the Facts and the
Inference in such a manner, that the Evidence of the Inference is
manifest: just as the Logic of Deduction consists in stating the
Premises and the Conclusion in such a manner that the Evidence of
the Conclusion is manifest._
APHORISM XVIII.
_The Logic of Deduction is exhibited by means of a certain Formula;
namely, a Syllogism; and every train of deductive reasoning, to be
demonstrative, must be capable of resolution into a series of such
Formulæ legitimately constructed. In like manner, the Logic of
Induction may be exhibited by means of certain_ Formulæ; _and every
train of inductive inference to be sound, must be capable of
resolution into a scheme of such Formulæ, legitimately constructed._
APHORISM XIX.
_The_ inductive act of thought _by which several Facts are
colligated into one Proposition, may be expressed by saying:_ The
several Facts are exactly expressed as one Fact, if, and only if, we
adopt the Conceptions and the Assertion _of the Proposition._
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