Novum organon renovatum: Being the second part of the philosophy of the inductive sciencesWhewell, William
Philosophy
Novum organon renovatum: Being the second part of the philosophy of the inductive sciences
Whewell, William
Science -- Philosophy
PROP.--When any Force acts upon a body in motion, the motion which
the Force would produce in the {112} body at rest is compounded with
the previous motion of the body.
And in like manner in other cases.
In these cases the proposition is, of course, established, and the
definition realized, by an enumeration of the facts. And in the case
of inferences made in such a form, the Definition of the Conception
and the Assertion of the Truth are both requisite and are
correlative to one another. Each of the two steps contains the
verification and justification of the other. The Proposition derives
its meaning from the Definition; the Definition derives its reality
from the Proposition. If they are separated, the Definition is
arbitrary or empty, the Proposition vague or ambiguous.
16. But it must be observed that neither of the preceding Formulæ
expresses the full cogency of the inductive proof. They declare only
that the results can be clearly explained and rigorously deduced by
the employment of a certain Definition and a certain Proposition.
But in order to make the conclusion demonstrative, which in perfect
examples of Induction it is, we ought to be able to declare that the
results can be clearly explained and rigorously declared _only_ by
the Definition and Proposition which we adopt. And in reality, the
conviction of the sound inductive reasoner does reach to this point.
The Mathematician asserts the Laws of Motion, seeing clearly that
they (or laws equivalent to them) afford the only means of clearly
expressing and deducing the actual facts. But this conviction, that
the inductive inference is not only consistent with the facts, but
necessary, finds its place in the mind gradually, as the
contemplation of the consequences of the proposition, and the
various relations of the facts, becomes steady and familiar. It is
scarcely possible for the student at once to satisfy himself that
the inference is thus inevitable. And when he arrives at this
conviction, he sees also, in many cases at least, that there may be
other ways of expressing the substance of the truth established,
besides that special Proposition which he has under his notice.
{113}
We may, therefore, without impropriety, renounce the undertaking of
conveying in our formula this final conviction of the necessary
truth of our inference. We may leave it to be thought, without
insisting upon saying it, that in such cases what _can_ be true,
_is_ true. But if we wish to express the ultimate significance of
the Inductive Act of thought, we may take as our Formula for the
Colligation of Facts by Induction, this:--'The several Facts are
exactly expressed as one Fact if, _and only if_, we adopt the
Conception and the Assertion' of the inductive inference.
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