After my letter of yesterday I have little to add. I can only again implore your most serious consideration to the whole question, and your instant decision on the line that is to be pursued; not merely here, but with the whole army. No half measures will at this moment answer: and unless some effort is made to appease the minds of the deluded officers of this army, you must make military preparations to reduce them to order; and these must be directed against every station under your Presidency: for though success may be various, an effectual opposition will be made at all; and none are more violent than some of those nearest the Presidency. If you adopt a measure of the nature that I recommended yesterday, it should be _quite final_; and therefore embrace every concession and act of conciliation _that you can make_, without a substantial sacrifice of the dignity of Government. I can think of no improvement to this order, except you conceive the great object of avoiding hostilities would justify the following addition to it: "Government received a representation from a number of the officers of the coast army, in which they solicited the equalization of their allowances with those of the officers of the Bengal army. This is a subject, the consideration of which must exclusively rest with the Court of Directors, under whose notice this application will, _in course_, be brought, and by whose decision it will be the duty of the officers of the coast army to abide." This order, which is only a repetition of facts added to what I suggested yesterday, would, I think, _if firmly acted upon_, completely end the present agitation; or, at all events, you would only have a part to combat instead of the whole. Every man who was not lost to reason and loyalty would be recovered; and the few that resisted, if any did, would soon be reduced. This mode of settlement would, it may be stated, give a triumph to the army, establish a dangerous precedent, and violate fundamental principles of the Indian Government: but it is not principles, but an empire, that is in danger: and what other course can be adopted? No man can calculate the consequences of a contest between Government and its army. The delusion which prevailed, that the officers would never proceed to extremes, is now completely dissipated. I have read papers, from almost every division, calling upon this garrison to commence opposition; and I, two hours ago, read another paper from the Hyderabad force, approving of the proceedings of the garrison at this place in the cases of the marines and Colonel Innes, declaring it to be the cause of the whole, and promising full support. I knew papers of the same kind will be received, as fast as the tappals can bring them, from every station in the army, and that they are all pledged never to let a man or officer of this garrison be punished for a proceeding which they consider (and with truth) to have been caused