[59] I always thought, and always must think, that there is a wide difference between the seditious combination of a body of officers and a mutiny of soldiers, and that the two cases require a distinct treatment. With the latter there can hardly be two modes of proceeding; with the former there may be various, and all equally safe. They may be restored by the influence of reason, and subdued by the operation of their own feelings. Their minds may be reclaimed by many modes that could not be applied to their men; and there is, in the worst extremes, a character in their opposition that admits more of the application of such remedies than the mad and instinctive action of a mutinous soldiery. These two cases were certainly confounded at Madras; and most of the evils that arose may be imputed to the fallacy of treating a seditious combination of officers as a mutiny of soldiers. [60] The danger that had been incurred was sufficient to authorize Government to take the most decisive measures to guard against the revival of such combinations against authority: and though numbers who might have merited punishment had escaped, _not one object of benefit to either individuals or the army at large had been attained_; and it is therefore quite extravagant to assert such a termination could ever have tended to encourage future proceedings of a similar nature. [61] The account of what occurred at this station on the day General Close made the noble effort he did to carry the orders of the Government of Madras into execution, shows the desperate hazard that was incurred. If, says an officer of high rank, during the period that between four and five thousand troops were in a state of mutinous violence and uproar, "one musket had gone off by accident, not a man of his Majesty's 33d regiment would have been left alive, and a general massacre of almost all Europeans would have been the most certain result." [62] No consideration of this question can be local or limited. If a successful example of disobedience or rebellion was exhibited by our native troops on the Madras establishment, its baneful effects would not be limited to that part of our possessions. [63] I spoke to Colonel Barclay before I wrote upon this subject, and he said he would show my note to Sir G. Barlow, and obtain me an answer that would vindicate my character from the charge to which the Governor's change of resolution had made me liable. This circumstance left me without a doubt that the cautious reply I received from that officer was by the direction of Sir G. Barlow. Indeed, I was satisfied that this excellent and respectable officer, for whom I have always entertained the same sentiments of esteem and friendship, never acted in any part of those transactions, in which his name appears, _but by the specific instructions or orders the Governor_. [64] Post. [65] See a copy of this in the Appendix. [66] The officers of that force had signed the test.