Of the importance of religious opinionsNecker, Jacques
Religion
Of the importance of religious opinions
Necker, Jacques
Christianity -- Early works to 1800
have perceived in the little space we are permitted to inspect.
The author of a celebrated work accuses men of presumption, because,
when they endeavour to trace the first principle of things, by comparing
their own faculties with it, they seem to think that they approach it.
But, what other part should we be able to take, when we are called to
reason and to judge? It is not sufficient that the idea of the Supreme
Being may be metaphysical; it is necessary further, some will argue,
that we even try to render it abstract, by removing it out of our
imagination, and that we seek for, in our judgment and opinions, a
support which may be in a manner absent from ourselves, and absolutely
foreign to our nature. All this cannot be understood: we confess that we
have not sufficient strength to know the essence and perfection of God,
but giving way to abstraction, we extinguish our natural light, and
deprive ourselves of the few means we have to obtain this knowledge; we
can only be acquainted with unknown things by the help of those we know:
we shall be led astray, if we are obliged to take another road; and
modern philosophers often seek to attack intimate sentiments by
arbitrary ideas, of which an imagination the most capricious is the only
foundation.
It will then always be surprizing, that in our contemplations and habits
of thinking, the wisdom of the design, the harmony of the whole, and the
perfection of parts, are manifest traces of intelligence; and yet that
we should renounce, suddenly, this manner of feeling and judging, in
order to attribute the formation of the universe to the effect of
chance, or the eternal laws of blind necessity; and is it possible, that
we can deduce the same consequences from an admirable order, as from
wild confusion? Facts so different, principles so contrary, should not
lead to the same conclusion; the magnificent system of the universe
ought to have some weight, when we conjecture about its origin; and it
would be difficult to persuade us, that in investigating the most
exalted truths, we ought to consider all the knowledge we acquire by the
view of nature as merely indifferent. Men are carried very far, when
they reject the arguments drawn from final causes; it is not only a
single thought they would destroy, it is the source of all our knowledge
they would dry up.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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