Old Europe's Suicide; or, The Building of a Pyramid of Errors: An Account of Certain Events in Europe During the Period 1912–1919Thomson, Christopher Birdwood, Baron
History
Old Europe's Suicide; or, The Building of a Pyramid of Errors: An Account of Certain Events in Europe During the Period 1912–1919
Thomson, Christopher Birdwood, Baron
Balkan Peninsula -- History -- War of 1912-1913; Eastern question (Balkan); World War, 1914-1918
The Central Empires, however, made no serious effort to capture Galatz;
they appeared to be content with Braila and complete control of the
Danube Valley between that port and the Iron Gate. From a strategical
point of view their position was good. An immense force of Russians
was immobilized in Moldavia and held there by the threat to Odessa;
this force could only be freed for offensive operations by a complete
reversal of Allied policy in the Near East, a contingency not likely
to occur. In the meantime, the stocks of corn in Wallachia were being
transferred to Germany and restorative measures were being taken in
the oilfields, where the machinery and plant had been destroyed in
wholesale fashion during the retreat.
Famine was approaching in Moldavia and typhus was raging in the towns
and countryside, when the Allies convened a conference at Petrograd to
determine their future plans.
General Gourko had replaced General Alexieff as Chief of the Russian
Staff, owing to the illness of the latter. At the outset of the
Conference, Russia’s principal military delegate submitted an
appreciation of the military situation which, in so far as it concerned
Rumania, either displayed an inexcusable ignorance of the facts or
was intentionally false. He described new railway lines in Bessarabia
as approaching completion, whose construction could not be commenced
before the spring was far enough advanced to melt the ice and snow;
on such premises as these he based a plan of operations, which even
_Russian_ Generals on the spot described as suicide. The other Allied
representatives listened with grateful ears; for them, a Russo-Rumanian
offensive in the spring had many great advantages--it would relieve
the pressure on the Western front and help Cadorna on the Carso. They
argued that if the General Staff in Petrograd thought this offensive
could be made, it was the best solution of the problem, and all that
remained for them to do was to arrange for liberal supplies of war
material and guns.
It is difficult to believe that the Government of the Czar, had it
survived, would have permitted this offensive to take place; a few
ambitious Generals may have been in favour of it, but the rulers of
Russia had realized that autocracies which made war on the Central
Empires, were undermining the last barrier against the advancing flood
of democratic sentiment, and were, in fact, cutting their own throats.
Both at the Imperial Court and in Government circles, German influence
was gaining ground, and the Russian people as a whole were profoundly
pessimistic. Germany was considered irresistible, officers of high rank
admitted that if Mackensen invaded Bessarabia, salvation could be found
only in retreat. They talked of a retirement to the Volga even, and the
Rumanians listened with dismay.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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