Old-Fashioned Ethics and Common-Sense Metaphysics: With Some of Their ApplicationsThornton, William Thomas
Philosophy
Old-Fashioned Ethics and Common-Sense Metaphysics: With Some of Their Applications
Thornton, William Thomas
Metaphysics; Utilitarianism
measureless might may, in some future stage of existence, afford
compensation for the apparently inequitable distribution of good and
evil which, according to all experience, has hitherto taken place among
human beings?
Were it desirable to amplify the apology with which this paper
commenced, some additional justification of the freedom of the
foregoing criticisms might be found in hints thrown out by Hume in
various parts of the treatise which we have been examining, and
particularly in its concluding chapter, that in many of his most
startling doctrines he was but half in earnest. Hume's temperament, too
cool for fanaticism, had yet in it enough of a certain tepid geniality
to save him from becoming a scoffer. The character which he claims for
himself, and somewhat ostentatiously parades, is that of a sceptic or
general doubter--a character in which, when rightly understood, there is
nothing to be ashamed of. To take nothing on trust, to believe nothing
without proof, to show no greater respect for authority than may consist
in attentive and candid examination of its statements, to accept only
verified facts as bases for reasoning on matters of fact and
existence--these are golden rules of philosophical research, principles
in which lies the secret of all real progress in any of the higher
departments of science. By Hume they were adopted _con amore_, and with
keen appreciation, not more of their practical utility, than of the
sport which he perceived them to be capable of yielding. His serious
purpose was to unmask the numberless pretences which in politics,
political economy, metaphysics, morals, and theology he found
universally current as gospel truths; to expose the ambiguity and
contradictions latent in popular thought, and in the popular forms of
expression which are so apt to be mistaken for thought, and to indicate
the only safe mode of investigation and the only trustworthy tests of
genuine knowledge; his favourite amusement to put time-honoured
commonplaces on the rack, and demanding their _raison d'etre_, to pass
on them summary sentence of extinction if they failed to account
satisfactorily for their existence. Unfortunately, in his keen
enjoyment of the fun of the thing, he not unfrequently overlooked the
solid interests at stake. Like a huntsman who, for the sake of a better
run, should outrace his quarry, or who, seeing that the dogs were close
upon the hare, should, in order to prolong the chase, start a fresh
hare, kept till then snug at his saddle-bow, so Hume, in the excitement
of metaphysical pursuit, instead of stopping to gather up whatever
verified affirmations came in his way, would prefer to follow any new
negation that he espied, or, if momentarily accepting any affirmation as
established, would proceed forthwith to affirm its direct opposite with
the view of neutralising both. In this, his practice resembled that of
metaphysicians in general, who take a singular delight in setting
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