Old-Fashioned Ethics and Common-Sense Metaphysics: With Some of Their ApplicationsThornton, William Thomas
Philosophy
Old-Fashioned Ethics and Common-Sense Metaphysics: With Some of Their Applications
Thornton, William Thomas
Metaphysics; Utilitarianism
In pronouncing this to be exceedingly evil counsel, as with the most
unfeigned respect for its author I feel bound at once to do, it might
not be necessary for me to undertake a detailed topographical survey of
the path alluded to. It might, perhaps, suffice to specify the
conclusions to which the path is represented as leading, in order to
show that those conclusions cannot possibly be reached by any such
route. By Professor Huxley himself they are thus described:--We know
nothing of matter 'except as a name for the unknown and hypothetical
cause of states of our own consciousness,' nor of spirit, except that
'it also is a name for an unknown and hypothetical cause of states of
consciousness. In other words matter and spirit are but names for the
imaginary _substrata_ of groups of natural phenomena.'
But if matter be not a thing, but a name, and a name too not for a real,
but only an imaginary thing, one perfect certainty is that matter cannot
possibly be composed either wholly or in part of molecules, and, by
necessary consequence, that life cannot possibly be 'the product of any
disposition of material molecules,' nor the phenomena of life be
'expressions of molecular changes in the matter of life.' Of the
particular Huxleian doctrine which we are considering, the two moieties
are absolutely irreconcileable; so that on the assumption that either
moiety were true, the truth of that moiety would be decisive against the
other. If matter have no real, and only a nominal existence, life, which
is undeniably a reality, cannot be a property of matter. If life, being
an undisputed reality, be a property of matter, matter must needs be a
reality also, and not merely a name. Any one, however, who, like myself,
is thoroughly convinced that both halves of the doctrine are equally and
utterly erroneous, is precluded from employing one for the refutation of
the other, and in order to prove, as I shall now attempt to do, that
life is in no sense either a product or a property of matter, must
resort for the purpose to independent reasoning.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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