Old-Fashioned Ethics and Common-Sense Metaphysics: With Some of Their ApplicationsThornton, William Thomas
Philosophy
Old-Fashioned Ethics and Common-Sense Metaphysics: With Some of Their Applications
Thornton, William Thomas
Metaphysics; Utilitarianism
tactile sensation will be experienced as if at the end of the stick,
where, however, it plainly cannot be. It is the mind alone which feels,
but which, by a peculiar faculty of localisation or extradition, seems
to remove a feeling exclusively its own, not only to the outside of
itself, but to the outside also of the walls of its fleshly tenement.
And as it is with pain or touch, so it is with every sensation with
which any of the so-called secondary qualities of matter are identical.
If I look at, or smell, or taste a blood orange, the sensation of
colour, or scent, or flavour I receive is entirely and exclusively my
own, the orange remaining quite unconscious of its own redness, or
fragrance, or sweetness, and not, indeed, possessing in itself any real
qualities of the kind. For to take redness as an example; how does the
sensation of it or of any other colour arise? The waves of a certain
very attenuated medium, the particles of which are vibrating with vast
rapidity but with very different velocities, strike upon an object and
are thrown off in all directions. Of the particles which vibrate with
any particular velocity, some are gathered by the optical apparatus of
the eye, and deflected so as to impinge on the retina and on the fibres
of the optic nerve therewith connected, producing in these fibres a
change which is followed by other changes in the brain, which, again, by
virtue of some inscrutable union between the brain and the mind, create
a feeling or consciousness of colour. What the particular colour shall
be, depends either on the rate of motion in the vibrating medium or on
the character of the retina; and if, while the former remained the same,
the other were to be altered, or if two persons, with differently formed
retinas, and one of the two colour-blind, were to be looking, what had
first seemed red might now seem green, or what seemed red to one
spectator might seem green to the other. But as the same object cannot
itself be both red and green at the same time, it follows that what are
called its redness and greenness are not in it, but in the spectator.
Similarly, the sounds which an object appears to give forth neither are
nor ever were in it: they originate in the mind of the hearer, and have
not, and never have had any existence elsewhere. 'If the whole body were
an eye, where,' asks St. Paul, 'were the hearing? If the whole were
hearing, where were the smelling?' and Professor Huxley more than meets
the drift of the Apostle's questions by pronouncing it 'impossible to
imagine but that if the universe contained only blind and deaf beings,
darkness and silence would reign everywhere.'
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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