Old-Fashioned Ethics and Common-Sense Metaphysics: With Some of Their ApplicationsThornton, William Thomas
Philosophy
Old-Fashioned Ethics and Common-Sense Metaphysics: With Some of Their Applications
Thornton, William Thomas
Metaphysics; Utilitarianism
The absence from matter of any such substance is evidenced by the
absurdity involved in the idea of its presence. Suppose the substance to
exist: the qualities inherent in it must needs be as completely distinct
from itself as pins are from a pincushion; the extension and solidity of
an extended, solid substance can no more be identical with the substance
than the nominative is identical with the genitive case. The substance,
therefore, although deprived of all its qualities will still retain its
essence unimpaired, will still be equally a substance, just as a
pincushion continues equally a pincushion after its last pin has been
abstracted. Conceive, then, all the qualities of matter to be
abstracted, and consider what remains--a substance without qualities of
any sort. But a substance neither solid, nor fluid, nor yet gaseous;
neither coloured nor colourless; neither singular nor plural; without
form and void, without even extension--what is it? not something, but
nothing; a nonentity or non-existence. The qualities of matter in being
removed from the substance have therefore left nothing behind, and,
consequently, although carrying with them nothing but themselves, have
yet carried with them all the constituents of matter, which is thus
seen to be composed exclusively of qualities without a single particle
of foreign admixture. And since, moreover, the qualities of matter are
clearly not themselves substances, that is to say do not themselves
_stand under_ or uphold anything, it follows that their compound,
matter, must likewise be purely unsubstantial.
The edifice begun by Descartes has now been raised high and strong
enough to have its layer of negations crowned with an affirmation of
pre-eminent importance. The qualities of matter, being known only by
their effects, are evidently causes: and, being causes, must necessarily
be either themselves forces, or, at the least, manifestations of force;
and inasmuch as force involves exertion, it cannot be inert; and
inasmuch as deadness must be incapable of exertion, all force must be
alive; and life without substance cannot be conceived otherwise than as
some species of spirit or mind. Such therefore must be matter. Matter
can be nothing else than pure spirit of some kind.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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