Old-Fashioned Ethics and Common-Sense Metaphysics: With Some of Their ApplicationsThornton, William Thomas
Philosophy
Old-Fashioned Ethics and Common-Sense Metaphysics: With Some of Their Applications
Thornton, William Thomas
Metaphysics; Utilitarianism
Though speaking of this as a show of reasoning, I would by no means be
understood to consider it as merely a show. On the contrary, I must
admit that it contains a modicum of reality sufficient, in my opinion,
to secure the position taken up from being utterly overthrown by any
direct attack not followed up by reference to a certain palpable
absurdity which we shall presently perceive to be inseparably connected
with the position. To so much of real reasoning as we have before us,
let then all due respect be shown. No doubt all existences must
necessarily dispose themselves or be disposed somehow. No doubt all
occurrences must succeed each other somehow. No doubt, either, that if
the disposing or otherwise originating forces operated quite
regardlessly of plan, no one disposition or succession would be a whit
less possible than any other--the most symmetric or evenly graduated
than the most disjointed or confused. Now although, since exertion is
utterly inconceivable without volition, and since volition is equally
inconceivable without consciousness, it must be impossible for any
forces ever to exert themselves altogether unintentionally, it is yet
perfectly possible for their exertion to have no ulterior intention
beyond that of gratifying an unprospective will. This is all that one
fidgetting about, as the phrase is, intends, when he has no special
motive for fidgetting in any particular direction more than in any
other, and similarly it may by possibility be the mere fidgettiness of
Nature that gives rise to all natural phenomena. Nature, indeed, cannot,
any more than any other force or combination of forces, be utterly
destitute of intelligence, but its intelligence may not inconceivably be
of no higher sort than that which the sensitive plant exhibits or
mimics. Nature cannot exert itself quite unconsciously, nor consequently
quite unintentionally, but its exertions, though not unintended, may
possibly not be intended for any result. It must be admitted, then,
that, so far, no reason has appeared why the force or forces by which
the universe was originally moulded, may not, as contended, have been
perfectly heedless and reckless; may not, without the least
premeditation or the slightest view to any ulterior object, have
produced certain phenomena in those particular sequences to which the
name of natural laws has been given; and may not, with the same total
absence of purpose, have adopted certain other courses of action which,
very fortunately, though quite undesignedly, have resulted in the
production of endless varieties of mechanism, most of them of
marvellously intricate and complex structure, and all and each of them
of structure marvellously suitable for performing, in co-operation with
Nature's laws, functions of an utility as varied as their structure. And
what any forces have been equal to do once, those same forces, if
remaining unimpaired, must be equal to repeat times without number.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account