Old-Fashioned Ethics and Common-Sense Metaphysics: With Some of Their ApplicationsThornton, William Thomas
Philosophy
Old-Fashioned Ethics and Common-Sense Metaphysics: With Some of Their Applications
Thornton, William Thomas
Metaphysics; Utilitarianism
A third hypothesis indeed remains for any who are content to believe
that Nature's elementary forces having, without knowing what they were
about, constructed the human body, the human mind, until then a
houseless wanderer, lit upon it by chance, and, observing it to be a
habitation suitably swept and garnished, entered in and dwelt there.
Upon this supposition there must be, within the limits of our terrene
sphere, two distinct species of intelligence, a greater and a
lesser--the one competent to construct all sorts of marvellously complex
and marvellously serviceable machines, yet incompetent to understand
their utility, the other fully perceiving the utility of the machines,
yet utterly incompetent to fabricate them. But there are probably few
adventurers on the ocean of speculation who would not prefer total
shipwreck to the shelter of such a harbour of refuge as this.
Atheism must in fairness be acknowledged to have much mended its manners
within the last two or three generations. Its tone and language are no
longer of the rude, scoffing sort at which Voltaire may be readily
pictured as breaking into voluble protest, or Hume as contemptuously
opening his eyes and shrugging his shoulders. Though grown more civil,
however, it cannot be complimented on having grown more rational. At
most may it be credited with being more elaborately irrational than of
old. It now no longer denies, it only ignores. It does not pronounce God
non-existent. It only insists that there is not complete proof that God
exists; thereupon, however, proceeding to argue as if He did not exist,
and thereby, not simply confounding deficiency of proof on one side with
sufficiency of proof on the other, but overlooking an amount of proof
that on any other subject would, provisionally at least, be deemed
conclusive, and perversely rejecting an hypothesis which, whether
correct, or not, is at least a good working hypothesis, coinciding
exactly with most of the facts, and inconsistent with none of them, in
favour of an hypothesis which, even in the hands of a Huxley or a
Darwin, cannot be made to work at all.
II.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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