But if Will is the volition for the time being, irrespective of any qualitative characteristic, then we have to inquire as to the applicability to it of the term "Free." Now this term is antithetical to the two terms "restrained" and "constrained." Thus if a man's actions are hindered or forcefully prevented by the Will of others, that man's actions are not free. But if some of a man's motives are restrained or his actions constrained by the predominance of some other of his motives--as, for instance, when he performs actions which his conscience tells him are wrong--in his Will not free? The actions are his volitions. If some motives are restrained, and therefore not to be considered free, still the others which have gained the predominance have thereby become his Will; their operation proves their non-restraint or freedom, and the volition or Will is still free. The action is an evidence of freedom. Volition is always free. It is of different kinds, but this does not affect the conclusion that volition proves its own freedom. The Will is always and under all circumstances free. But although this disposes of the question theoretically, the ordinary man remains unconvinced, and clings to his belief in a Free Will, which is not merely this technical and universal Free Will, but must be interpreted as a power he feels himself to possess of choosing and determining his own actions; and if we say to him, "Undoubtedly you have this power; but your choice, and therefore your volition and consequent action, is still determined in the same manner as if you had not recognized the power," he will demur, and, logically or illogically, he will deny your position, and hold to his consciousness of what he calls his self-determining power over his own actions, which he places out of the line of Determinism, however unmeaning or paradoxical his assertions may be proved to be. It is this state of consciousness, this clinging to the belief held by many men in their own _power of self-rule_ over their own general conduct, and by most men in their own control over some of their activities, that Evolution is bound to account for and explain. Evolutionists do not sufficiently mark off this _practical_ part of the question from the _theoretical_ part, and thus leave imperfectly explained the consciousness of the so-called "Free Will." They deem that the explanation of Free Will is included in an explanation of Will, and therefore they only deal incidentally and imperfectly with self-rule. The confusion arises from the term Free Will having two meanings--the theoretic or scientific one, as opposed to Determinism, and the practical one, as implying the power of self-rule, choice, effort, and determination.