As we have said already,[408] the active and the contemplative lives are
distinguished by the different occupations of men who are aiming at
different ends, one being the consideration of Truth--the goal of the
contemplative life; the other external works with which the active life
is occupied. But it is clear that the moral virtues are not especially
concerned with the contemplation of truth but with action; thus the
Philosopher says[409]: "For virtue, knowledge is of little or no avail."
It is therefore manifest that the moral virtues essentially belong to
the active life; and in accordance with this the Philosopher[410] refers
the moral virtues to active happiness.
Some, however, maintain that all the acts of the moral virtues do not
belong to the active life, thus:
1. The active life seems to consist solely in those things which have to
do with our neighbour; for S. Gregory says[411]: "The active life means
breaking bread to the hungry;" and at the close, after enumerating many
things which have to do with our neighbour, he adds: "And to provide for
each according as they have need." But not by all the acts of the moral
virtues are we brought into contact with others, but only by justice and
its divisions. Consequently all the acts of the moral virtues do not
belong to the active life.
But the chief of the moral virtues is justice, and by it a man
is brought into contact with his neighbour, as the Philosopher
proves.[412] We describe, then, the active life by those things
by means of which we are brought into contact with our
neighbour; yet we do not thereby mean that the active life
consists solely in these things, but chiefly in them.
2. Again, S. Gregory says[413]: "By Lia, who was blear-eyed but
fruitful, is signified the active life which sees less clearly, since
occupied with works; but when, now by word, now by example, it arouses
its neighbour to imitation, it brings forth many children in good
works." But all this seems rather to come under charity, by which we
love our neighbour, than under the moral virtues. Consequently the acts
of the moral virtues seem not to belong to the active life.
But a man can, by acts of all the moral virtues, lead his
neighbour to good works by his example; and this S. Gregory here
attributes to the active life.
3. Lastly, the moral virtues dispose us to the contemplative life. But
disposition to a thing and the perfect attainment of that thing come
under the same head. Consequently the moral virtues do not belong to the
active life.
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