"But it will be vehemently urged that it is most preposterous to assert that we know all this by the senses. Upon this I remark that the phrase _by the senses_ is ambiguous. If by senses he meant the mere bodily organism--the eye, the ears, the nerves and the brain--I affirm that we know, and can know, nothing by this bodily part, which is a mere organ or instrument; that so far from knowing potency or extension, we do not know even color, or taste, or smell. But if by the senses he meant the mind exercised in sense-perception, summoned into activity by the organism, and contemplating cognitively the external world, then I maintain that we do know, and this intuitively, external objects as influencing us; that is, exercising powers in reference to us. I ask those who would doubt of this doctrine of what it is that they suppose the mind to be cognizant in sense-perception. If they say a mere sensation or impression in the mind, I reply that this is not consistent with the revelation of consciousness, which announces plainly that what we know is something extra-mental. If they say, with Kant, a mere phenomenon in the sense of appearance, then I reply that this, too, is inconsistent with consciousness, which declares that we know the thing."[70] [70] Pp. 71 and 72. The statements contained in these extracts are plainly in a state of civil war, and might be left, without foreign aid, to complete their own destruction. I shall first let them criticize each other. (1) It is asserted that it may be difficult to ascertain the exact point or surface at which the mind and body come together and influence each other--in particular how far into the body--but that it is certain that _when they do meet_ mind knows body as having its essential properties of extension and resisting energy. This knowledge is said to arise _when they meet_, be it marked, and not before. (2) It is also asserted that it is _through the body_ that the mind attains its knowledge of _all_ material objects beyond. This makes our knowledge of objects beyond the body mediate and not immediate. Why are objects beyond the body regarded as mediately known? No reason is suggested except that they are not themselves in contact with the mind, but only in contact with that which is in contact with the mind. It is then presumable that _any parts of the bodily organism which never themselves meet the mind (if there are any such) are not known immediately_, but only through the parts which do meet the mind. That is, they are known mediately, too. That there are, or at least may be, such parts, is directly inferrible from the statement that we do not know "how far into the body" mind and body come together.