On Sameness and Identity: A Psychological Study: Being a Contribution to the Foundations of a Theory of KnowledgeFullerton, George Stuart
Philosophy
On Sameness and Identity: A Psychological Study: Being a Contribution to the Foundations of a Theory of Knowledge
Fullerton, George Stuart
Knowledge, Theory of
* * * * "When a point moves along a line, we know that between any two
positions of it there is an infinite number (in this new sense[73]) of
intermediate positions. That is because the motion is continuous. Each
of those positions is where the point was at some instant or other.
Between the two end positions on the line, the point where the motion
began and the point where it stopped, there is no point of the line
which does not belong to that series. We have thus an infinite series
of successive positions of a continuously moving point, and in that
series are included all the points of a certain piece of line-room. May
we say then that the line is made up of that infinite series of points?
[73] Professor Clifford has used the word _number_ in two senses,
a quantitative and a qualitative. By number in the latter sense he
means simply _unlimited units_.
"Yes; if we mean no more than that the series makes up the _points_ of
the line. But _no_, if we mean that the line is made up of those points
in the same way that it is made up of a great many very small pieces of
line. A point is not to be regarded as a _part_ of a line, in any sense
whatever. It is the boundary between two parts."
These extracts suffice, I think, to show what the common doctrine is,
and to show also the unavoidable difficulties connected with it.
These were clearly seen long ago. Motion, argues Zeno of Elea,[74]
cannot begin, because a body in motion must pass through an infinite
number of intermediate places before it can arrive at any other place.
Achilles can never overtake the tortoise, for by the time that he has
reached the place where it was, it has always moved a little beyond.
If Professor Clifford could not move a thing from one position to
another, without making it go though an infinite number of intermediate
positions, if these positions must be gone through with successively,
and if infinite really mean _without any end_, then the final member
of the series could never have been reached, for the plain reason that
there is no final member to an endless series. If the new position is
reached without passing through every member of the series and leaving
none farther to pass through, it is not reached by passing through an
infinite number of intermediate positions. The difficulty here is a
hopeless one; either the series has a final member, _and then it is not
infinite_; or it has not, _and then one cannot come to the end_.
[74] Ueberweg, Hist. of Philos., Vol. I, § 20. N. Y., 1877,
pp. 57-58.
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