It is possible that some one may wish to find a way out of this difficulty by distinguishing, as Clifford has done, between the _points_ of the line and the _parts_ of the line. But this distinction is of no service. All these points are declared to be on the line, and anything that passes over the whole line must exhaust them one by one until it arrives at the final point. By hypothesis, there is no final point to the series--the series is without any end. Unless, then, the line can be passed over without passing over the points, there would seem to be no help in turning to line pieces. Moreover, it appears reasonable to assume that there are as many parts to the line as there are points. For all these points are on the line, and no two of them are in precisely the same position on the line; they must consequently be on different parts of the line. If it be objected that, having no extension, they cannot properly be said to be _on_ parts of the line, I answer that, even on this hypothesis, they must be _at_ different parts of the line, in order to be distinguished from each other. The part of the line between any two of them is certainly not the same as the part between any other two. It follows that the number of parts of which the line is made up is at least as great as the number of points less one, if we refuse to say that the points are on the line; and is as great as the number of points, if we are willing to say that they are on the line. To move over the whole line, then, a point must come within one term of the end of an endless series, or it must pass over an endless number of small pieces of line until it comes to the very end. Does this seem a sensible doctrine? The rival doctrine, sometimes called the Berkeleyan, contains no such difficulties, and it makes evident that the difficulties discussed above arise simply out of a confusion of samenesses, and are gratuitous. Its discussion demands that I call to mind a few distinctions already made. One must bear in mind, in the first place, that a line immediately known, existing in consciousness, is the same with an "external" line corresponding to it, not in sense first, but in sense seventh. That is, they are two lines, not one, and in the interests of clearness they should be considered separately. One should remember, in the second place, that a line in consciousness at one moment is not, in the strictest sense, the same with a line in consciousness at another moment. One may stand for the other and thus be the same with it in sense fifth; or the two may be regarded as both belonging to the one series of experiences, which, taken together, represent to us "an object," in which case they are the same in sense third. A thing the same with another thing in either of these senses is not necessarily much like it. It must only be able to serve as its representative.