The word is often used quite loosely, but where the attempt is made to distinguish between identity and sameness in a looser sense, and to use terms with some precision, the former word serves to indicate sameness in which there is no consciousness of duality, or in which the consciousness of duality has fallen into the background and may easily be overlooked. Sameness of the first kind, for example, is spoken of as identity. This is the only kind of sameness in which there is no element of duality at all. The use of the word identity is not, however, restricted to this. Locke's inquiry concerning the identity of masses of inorganic matter, of vegetables, of animals, and of persons, has to do with sameness of the third kind on the list. In this kind of sameness there is no clear consciousness that one is dealing with more than one thing, and Locke's discussion is conducted throughout as though one were not. It may be objected that in certain other kinds there is often no clear consciousness of duality, and yet one does not think of using the term identity. This is quite true. The two kinds mentioned have been thought worthy of special discussion by logician and philosopher, and have been given a technical name. The others have not. Still, although the word is not commonly used in such cases, it would, I fancy, seem natural to use it in a direct ratio to the degree in which the sense of duality falls into the background. Dr. Johnson would probably have been willing to say that the stone he saw himself kick was identical with the one the existence of which he wanted to prove. Bishop Berkeley could have felt only disgust at such a use of the term. Scarcely anyone, I suppose, would regard himself as speaking strictly if he called the fourth kind of sameness identity. The co-existence of the two things compared would prevent their being confounded. Without, then, attempting to assign any very exact limits to the application of a somewhat loosely used word, I may repeat my former statement that men use the word identity to mark certain kinds of sameness in which there is little or no consciousness of duality, and they are not inclined to use it to mark samenesses in which things are recognized as similar but clearly distinct.