On Sameness and Identity: A Psychological Study: Being a Contribution to the Foundations of a Theory of KnowledgeFullerton, George Stuart
Philosophy
On Sameness and Identity: A Psychological Study: Being a Contribution to the Foundations of a Theory of Knowledge
Fullerton, George Stuart
Knowledge, Theory of
And now it is not difficult to guess why we employ such expressions as
we do to indicate strict identity. If I habitually use the proposition
"x is y" to indicate a relation between two things having similar
elements and yet regarded as distinct, and look upon the proposition
as justified by the similar elements, observing that, these remaining
unchanged, the dissimilar elements may be very variable without
affecting the truth of the proposition, what more natural than that I
should go on using the propositional form when the dissimilar elements
have diminished to zero--when the proposition has become "x is x"? To
be sure, no one can take such a proposition literally, any more than
one can soberly believe that one divided by zero results in infinity.
Such expressions have their use and value, but they must be properly
understood. If one uses the expression "x is x" to emphasize the fact
that one is not to pass from x to any y or z--that one is to rule out
all distinction or sense of difference, the use cannot be harmful.
And the use of the propositional form has this great convenience: it
puts a period, so to speak, to one's thinking, and prevents one from
casting about for a completion of the thought. If one merely say to me
"x," I shall probably take it as a subject and busy myself to find a
predicate. If he say "x is x," he says really no more than x, but he
makes me fix my thoughts upon x alone.
SEC. 20. In the foregoing search for the element that the kinds of
sameness have in common, I have had in mind chiefly the samenesses of
things immediately known. It is not necessary to repeat the search in
the field of the "external." We have but the seven kinds of sameness,
and whatever may be the things that are the same in these several ways,
the elements I have indicated must be present if our words are to be
significant. But one thing remains for me to do in this part of my
monograph, and that will not detain me long. I must distinguish between
sameness and identity, or rather point out to what kinds of sameness
this latter word is commonly applied.
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