Twenty objects in one consciousness must not be confounded with twenty objects in another. When we speak of two men as seeing the same thing, we do not mean that the object in one mind is the same with the object in the other in sense first, but in sense sixth. This does not prevent them from being two. A single object in one mind may be the same with itself in sense first. A number of similar objects in one mind may be the same in sense fourth. Two objects or two classes of objects in different minds may be the same in sense sixth. One may, to be sure, think of twenty objects in one mind, and of the same (sense sixth) twenty objects in another mind as forty objects. Philosophical reflection naturally leads to this. I am inducing a reader to do it when I tell him that an object in one mind and the same object in another are two objects. But in doing this, one must bear in mind the fact that the forty objects belong to two quite distinct classes, and that common language would not reckon them as forty, but as twenty. In this there is, of course, a pitfall for the unwary. Now, when Plato looked for the object of the general name, for the x contained in a class of similar objects, what did he do? He created a new object distinct from and apart from all the others. He is very vague in his statements, and he was probably quite as vague in his thought; but I cannot see how anyone familiar with the Phaedrus, the Republic, the Timaeus, the Symposium and the Parmenides, and familiar with Plato's concrete way of thinking in images, can avoid coming to the conclusion that the Idea was to him predominantly an object, an individual--a vague and inconsistent object, if you please, but still an object. But _an_ x is in no sense a universal. It is the same with other x's only in sense fourth; that is, it is like them. The x that they have in common must be x considered simply, not x considered as here or there, in this place or in that. All such differences must be eliminated if one is to get not an individual, but a universal. If the Idea may be considered as _apart_ from objects, it is an object in so far not essentially differing from the others. Again, the Platonic Idea is an object, but not to be put upon the same plane with other objects. They suffer change, while it is immutable; they are perceivable by the senses, and it is not. The objects of sense and the Idea are in different worlds; and though we cannot accuse Plato of drawing the distinctions of the modern hypothetical realist, he has certainly given us a suggestive parallel to the Lockian ideas and "real" things. The trouble has arisen out of his difficulty in keeping an abstraction abstract; he has turned it into a concrete, and, finding in the world of sense no place for this concrete, this new individual, he has given it a world of its own. Whatever this object in this world apart may be, it is certainly not what is common to twenty individuals in the world of sensible things.