On Sameness and Identity: A Psychological Study: Being a Contribution to the Foundations of a Theory of KnowledgeFullerton, George Stuart
Philosophy
On Sameness and Identity: A Psychological Study: Being a Contribution to the Foundations of a Theory of Knowledge
Fullerton, George Stuart
Knowledge, Theory of
"Let us now accordingly consider the things which are commonly thought
the easiest of all to know, and which are thought also to be the most
distinctly known, that is, the bodies that we touch and see; not indeed
bodies in general, for these general notions are usually a little more
confused: but let us consider a single one of them. Let us take, for
example, this bit of wax; it has just been taken from the hive; it
has not yet lost the sweetness of the honey it contained; it still
keeps something of the odor of the flowers from which it has been
gathered; its color, its figure, its size, are apparent; it is hard,
it is cold, it is easily handled, and if struck it gives a sound. In
a word, everything that can make a body distinctly known is found in
this one. But notice, while I speak, it is placed near the fire; what
remained of savor and odor disappears, its color changes, its figure
is lost, its size increases, it becomes liquid, grows hot, one can
scarcely handle it, and when struck it no longer gives a sound. Does
the same wax remain after this change? One must admit that it does; no
one doubts it; no one judges otherwise. What then was it that was known
with so much distinctness in this bit of wax? Certainly nothing that I
perceived by means of the senses, for all the things which fall under
taste, smell, sight, touch and hearing, are changed, and yet the same
wax remains. Perhaps it was what I think now, namely, that this wax
was neither the sweetness of honey, the agreeable odor of flowers, the
whiteness, the figure, nor the sound, but only a body which a little
before appeared to my senses under these forms, and which now appears
to them under others. But to speak precisely, what do I imagine when I
think it in this way? Let us consider it attentively, and abstracting
all that does not belong to the wax, let us see what remains. Surely
nothing remains but something extended, flexible and mutable. But what
is that, flexible and mutable? Is it not that I imagine that this bit
of wax, being round, is capable of becoming square and of changing
from square to triangular? No, it is certainly not that, for I think
it capable of an infinite number of similar changes; but I could not
run through this infinite number by my imagination, and consequently
this conception that I have of the wax is not due to the faculty of
imagination. But what now is this extension? Is it not also unknown?
For it becomes greater when the wax melts, greater when it boils, and
still greater when the heat increases, and I could not conceive clearly
and truly what wax is, if I did not think that even this bit that we
are considering is capable of receiving more varieties of extension
than I have ever imagined. It must then be admitted that I could not
comprehend by imagination even what this bit of wax is, and that only
my understanding can comprehend it. I say this particular bit of wax;
for as for wax in general, it is still more evident. But what is this
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