"But for a fuller explication of this point, and to show that the immediate objects of sight are not so much as the ideas or resemblances of things placed at a distance, it is requisite that we look nearer into the matter, and carefully observe what is meant in common discourse when one says that which he sees is at a distance from him. Suppose, for example, that looking at the moon I should say it were fifty or sixty semidiameters of the earth distant from me. Let us see what moon this is spoken of. It is plain it cannot be the visible moon, or anything like the visible moon, or that I see--which is only a round, luminous plain, of about thirty visible points in diameter. For, in case I am carried from the place where I stand directly toward the moon, it is manifest the object varies still as I go on; and, by the time that I am advanced fifty or sixty semidiameters of the earth, I shall be so far from being near a small, round, luminous flat that I shall perceive nothing like it--this object having long since disappeared, and, if I would recover it, it must be by going back to the earth from whence I set out."[53] [53] "Essay towards a New Theory of Vision." Sec. 44. Works: ed. Fraser. Oxford 1871. Vol. I, p. 53. So much for dissimilar experiences of the same object. And Berkeley is not impelled to assume an external something to explain how the object can be the same under the circumstances. The case, he finds, stands thus: "Having of a long time experienced certain ideas perceivable by touch--as distance, tangible figure, and solidity--to have been connected with certain ideas of sight, I do, upon perceiving these ideas of sight, forthwith conclude what tangible ideas are, by the wonted ordinary course of nature, like to follow. Looking at an object, I perceive a certain visible figure and color, with some degree of faintness and other circumstances, which, from what I have formerly observed, determine me to think that if I advance forward so many paces, miles, etc., I shall be affected with such and such ideas of touch."[54] [54] _Ibid._, § 45. And need one ask a clearer illustration of sameness in sense third than the case of the coach, which occurs in the following section: "Sitting in my study I hear a coach drive along the street; I look through the casement and see it; I walk out and enter into it. Thus, common speech would incline one to think I heard, saw, and touched the same thing, to wit, the coach. It is, nevertheless, certain the ideas intromitted by each sense are widely different and distinct from each other; but, having been observed constantly to go together, they are spoken of as one and the same thing."