On Sameness and Identity: A Psychological Study: Being a Contribution to the Foundations of a Theory of KnowledgeFullerton, George Stuart
Philosophy
On Sameness and Identity: A Psychological Study: Being a Contribution to the Foundations of a Theory of Knowledge
Fullerton, George Stuart
Knowledge, Theory of
"The notice we have by our senses of the existing of things without us,
though it be not altogether so certain as our intuitive knowledge, or
the deductions of our reason, employed about the clear abstract ideas
of our own minds; yet it is an assurance that deserves the name of
knowledge. If we persuade ourselves that our faculties act and inform
us right, concerning the existence of those objects that affect them,
it cannot pass for an ill-grounded confidence: for I think nobody can,
in earnest, be so sceptical as to be uncertain of the existence of
those things which he sees and feels. At least, he that can doubt so
far (whatever he may have with his own thoughts) will never have any
controversy with me; since he can never be sure I say anything contrary
to his own opinion. As to myself, I think God has given me assurance
enough of the existence of things without me; since by their different
application I can produce in myself both pleasure and pain, which
is one great concernment of my present state. This is certain, the
confidence that our faculties do not herein deceive us is the greatest
assurance we are capable of, concerning the existence of material
beings. For we cannot act anything but by our faculties; nor talk of
knowledge itself, but by the helps of those faculties which are fitted
to apprehend even what knowledge is. But besides the assurance we have
from our senses themselves, that they do not err in the information
they give us, of the existence of things without us, when they are
affected by them, we are farther confirmed in this assurance by other
concurrent reasons.
"First, it is plain those perceptions are produced in us by exterior
causes affecting our senses: because those that want the organs of any
sense never can have the ideas belonging to that sense produced in
their minds. This is too evident to be doubted: and therefore we cannot
but be assured that they come in by the organs of that sense, and no
other way. The organs themselves, it is plain, do not produce them; for
then the eyes of a man in the dark would produce colors, and his nose
smell roses in the winter: but we see nobody gets the relish of a pine
apple till he goes to the Indies, where it is, and tastes it.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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