On the Ethics of NaturalismSorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Philosophy
On the Ethics of Naturalism
Sorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Ethics; Ethics, Evolutionary
This practical tendency brings out the truth that it is not only by
the subordination of self to circumstances, and the restriction of
desire to present means of satisfaction, that the required harmony
between outer and inner relations can be brought about. The other
alternative is open: circumstances may be subordinated to self. For
this latter alternative the theory of evolution seems really to leave
room as much as for the former. It is excluded only when a one-sided
emphasis is laid on the necessity of adaptation to environment. For
evolution implies a gradually increasing heterogeneity of structure
as the prelude to perfect agreement with circumstances: "the limit
of heterogeneity towards which every aggregate progresses is the
formation of as many specialisations and combinations of parts as
there are specialised and combined forces to be met."[203] The end
of evolution is a correspondence between inner and outer which is
not produced by the easy method of both being very simple, but
which is consistent with, and indeed requires, the complexity and
heterogeneity produced in both by constant interaction.[204] The
greater this complexity, the more filled with sensation, emotion, and
thought life is, the greater is what Mr Spencer calls its "breadth."
But, if "adaptation" is still regarded as expressing the end, then,
the more perfect this adaptation is, the less room seems left for
progress, and the end of human conduct is placed in a state of moving
equilibrium in which action takes place without a jar and without
disturbing the play of external conditions.[205]
* * * * *
[Sidenote: (_b_) As describing the ultimate condition of life,]
This end of "adaptation" is looked upon by Mr Spencer not as
representing the conduct prescribed by morality in present
circumstances, but as describing the ultimate condition of human
life. As such, it is the foundation of his Absolute Ethics--that
"final permanent code" which "alone admits of being definitely
formulated, and so constituting ethics as a science in contrast with
empirical ethics."[206] The "philosophical moralist," he tells us,
"treats solely of the _straight_ man. He determines the properties of
the straight man; describes how the straight man comports himself;
shows in what relationship he stands to other straight men; shows
how a community of straight men is constituted. Any deviation
from strict rectitude he is obliged wholly to ignore. It cannot be
admitted into his premisses without vitiating all his conclusions.
A problem in which a _crooked_ man forms one of the elements is
insoluble by him."[207]
[Sidenote: complete correspondence with environment.]
[Sidenote: Resultant absolute code of ethics]
[Sidenote: (α) lays down abstract principles for relation of
individual to society;]
[Sidenote: (β) farther only defines end of conduct as adaptation;]
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