On the Ethics of NaturalismSorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Philosophy
On the Ethics of Naturalism
Sorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Ethics; Ethics, Evolutionary
By each new variation the existing relation between organism and
environment is disturbed. The variation may, however, prove its
utility at once by a more exact correspondence than before with
the requirements of external conditions. But, in what are called
the higher grades of life, variations from the type are sometimes
not immediately useful, although they may ultimately become
most advantageous.[229] Were it not for the remarkable power of
persistence possessed by the higher animals, the modified organism
would be unable to hold its own. The great majority of such eccentric
or extraordinary variations do, as a matter of fact, soon disappear,
because unable to prove their utility. But others of them, either by
the power they give the organism to mould circumstances to itself,
or by their appropriateness to the greater complexity which comes
with the increased number of living organisms, and the more delicate
readjustment it requires, prove themselves to be fitter to live than
if no variation had taken place and the preceding state of relative
equilibrium had been maintained. The higher adjustment of life to
its surroundings, which marks each stage of advancing evolution, had
its beginning in the rupture of the original simpler harmony that
previously existed.
[Sidenote: especially in human conduct.]
If we compare human conduct with that of animals lower in the organic
scale, it becomes evident that there is a broad difference between
the two in this, that actions in the former are purposed, performed
with a definite end in view; whereas, in the latter, they seem to be
the blind result of impulse, and there are slight, if any, traces of
purpose. In activity of the latter kind, natural selection works in
the ordinary way by choosing for survival the animals which behave so
as best to suit their environment. But actions done with a view to an
end may anticipate the verdict of this natural law. The agent may see
that conduct of a particular kind would conduce to the promotion of
life, while conduct of a different kind would render him less fit to
live; and, as a consequence, the former action may be chosen. In this
way development may be anticipated, and the present order of affairs
may be disturbed, more or less forcibly, in order to bring about a
foreseen better state of things.
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