On the Ethics of NaturalismSorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Philosophy
On the Ethics of Naturalism
Sorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Ethics; Ethics, Evolutionary
As it cannot be held that the more complex in evolution is of greater
authority than the less complex, nor that the later in evolution has
such authority over the earlier, we must admit that the so-called
"fundamental characteristics" of evolution, which find a place in
its definition or "formula," are unable to determine its value in an
ethical regard. The richness of life, physical, intellectual, and
social, has indeed been produced only as the result of a long course
of development, and by the assimilation of many various elements
into a complex organisation; but its value cannot be measured either
by the test of mechanical complexity, or by the length of time it
has taken to evolve. We must therefore seek some other method of
giving a meaning to evolution in the region of moral values; and we
find Mr Spencer himself really falling back in his discussion on
the more general answer to our question, that the end of evolution
is life: "evolution becomes the highest possible when the conduct
simultaneously achieves the greatest totality of life in self,
offspring, and fellow-men."[247] Since it appears, then, that the
characteristic of complexity or variety is as unsatisfactory a
criterion of morality, as the notion of "adaptation to environment"
was found to be, we must ask for some further interpretation of the
notion of "development" or "increase of life" when regarded as the
end of conduct.
* * * * *
[Sidenote: 3. Further attempt to define development or increase of
life as the end.]
[Sidenote: Biological definition of life insufficient.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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