On the Ethics of NaturalismSorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Philosophy
On the Ethics of Naturalism
Sorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Ethics; Ethics, Evolutionary
end or purpose of this efficiency which now requires determination.
In defining the typical man, we must have no idea of final cause or
purpose which is not rooted in the nature of his organism.
How, then, shall we now determine the type in conformity to which
perfection consists?[260]
[Sidenote: or as the normal,]
[Sidenote: or as what has strongest vitality or aids development,
that is,]
The first answer to this seems to be, that the type is what is
normal,--"what we have learned to regard as the normal development
of objects belonging to" the class.[261] But the normal may have
either of two meanings--it may, in the first place, mean the usual
or customary. This, however, would make the typical man mean the
ordinary or average man; and the ideal of conformity to the type
would be reduced to doing the customary thing, and not trying to be
better than one's neighbours. But it is evident that this stationary
morality does not represent properly what is fundamental in the
theory of evolution: "whatever other duties men may acknowledge,
they do not look upon it as a duty to preserve the species _in
statu quo_."[262] If natural science teaches one thing more clearly
than another, it is that the type, like the individual, is not
permanent, but the subject of gradual modifications. If the type
is what is normal, we must mean by "normal" something else than
customary. But the only other meaning of the word seems to imply a
reference to a rule--either a rule imposed from without, or an inner
constitution or order. If the former alternative is adopted, then
we may use another definition of Mr Stephen's, and say that "the
typical organism is ... that organism which is best fitted for all
the conditions of life, or, in other words, which has the strongest
vitality;"[263] and thus have to fall back either on the notion of
"adaptation to environment," or on that of "strongest vitality"--the
notion we are seeking to interpret. If the other meaning, which the
reference to a rule may convey, be adopted, then we are met by the
fact that the inner order or constitution which is to be our guide,
can (from our present empirical point of view) mean nothing different
from the line of development. And as we have already seen that it
is unsatisfactory to interpret this as equivalent to adaptation
to environment, or to increase of definiteness, coherence, and
heterogeneity, this principle of conformity to the type is reduced to
the general principle which we have been attempting to define more
exactly--increase of life.
[Sidenote: (β) Abundance and variety of vital power,]
[Sidenote: which falls back on the subjective standard.]
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