On the Ethics of NaturalismSorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Philosophy
On the Ethics of Naturalism
Sorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Ethics; Ethics, Evolutionary
that it can make no nearer approach to the discovery of an ethical
end, than to point out what courses of action are likely to be the
pleasantest, or what tendencies to action the strongest: while this
can only be done within certain limits. The doctrine of evolution
itself, when added to empirical morality, only widens our view of the
old landscape--does not enable us to pass from "is" to "ought," or
from efficient to final cause, any more than the telescope can point
beyond the sphere of spatial quantity.
[Sidenote: New point of view introduced by teleology]
We are endeavouring to get at the idea or end of human nature in an
impossible way when we attempt to reach it on purely empirical lines,
and think that, if we work long enough on them, we are sure to come
to it. In the same way it was formerly thought by physiologists that,
if we thoroughly examined the brain with microscope and scalpel, we
should come upon the seat of the soul at last, while psychologists
were fain to believe that, in addition to all our presentations
of objects, we had also a presentation of the subject or thinking
being. The mistake of both was in imagining that the soul was a thing
amongst other things, or a presentation amongst other presentations,
instead of the subject and condition of there being either things or
thoughts at all. Of a similar character is the attempt to get at an
end or final cause without leaving the point of view of efficient
causality. Were it successful, it would reduce final cause to
mechanism. To look upon man or upon nature as manifesting an end
implies an idea or notion of the object as a whole, over and above
the mutual determination of its various parts, and thus necessitates
the contemplation of it "as though an understanding contained the
ground of the unity of the multiplicity of its empirical laws."[276]
It is the attempt to get at an external purpose for objects of
experience that has made teleology be looked upon askance by men of
science. A conception of this kind went far to vitiate physics in
the middle ages, till it was, with justice, strictly excluded from
the scientific interpretation of nature by the leaders of modern
philosophy.[277] But teleology does not stand or fall with this
external form of it, which takes its illustrations from the products
of the factory, not from the manifestations of life,[278] and which
is really only mechanism misunderstood.
[Sidenote: necessary in considering life,]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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