"The doctrine of the post-Kantians, that all knowledge is also self-knowledge, seems to flow from this confusion [between the psychologist's standpoint and the standpoint of the feeling upon which he is supposed to be making his report]. Empirically, of course, an awareness of self accompanies most of our thinking. But that it should be needed to make that thinking 'objective' is quite another matter. 'Green-after-red-and-other-than-it' is an absolutely complete object of thought, ideally considered, and needs no added element. The fallacy seems to arise from some such reflection as this, that since the feeling _is_ what it feels itself to be, so it must feel itself to be what it _is_--namely, related to each of its objects. That the last _is_ covers much more ground than the first, the philosopher here does not notice. The first _is_ signifies only the feeling's inward quality; the last _is_ covers all possible facts _about_ the feeling,--relational facts, which can only be known from outside points of view, like that of the philosopher himself."[284] [Sidenote: though not itself a part of experience,] [Sidenote: logically implied by experience.] Now it seems to me that the real confusion here is between the point of view of experience, and the point of view of reflection on experience, and that it is not the "post-Kantians" who confuse the two points of view. The "post-Kantians"--by whom Professor James means T. H. Green and the writers commonly associated with him--habitually occupy the latter standpoint. They do not hold that "all knowledge is also self-knowledge," in the sense that "an awareness of self accompanies most [or all] of our thinking." When we have this empirical "awareness of self," our object is the more or less distinct contents of perception, &c., which make up the empirical ego. But this knowledge of the empirical ego, equally with knowledge of external nature, implies logically the action of self-consciousness. When we reflect upon experience, one constant element is seen to be implied in it--the reference to a subject of knowledge and feeling. Certainly "post-Kantians" do not imagine--as Professor James seems himself to imagine and to think they do--that a feeling feels itself, or an object knows itself. "Green-after-red-and-other-than-it" is for them, as for him, if not "an absolutely complete object of thought," yet relatively complete. It may be apprehended alone as a part of experience. But reflection on experience shows that it, like any other object of thought, depends upon a knowing subject. The "post-Kantians" do not assert that knowing an object involves for the individual knower actual consciousness of what his knowledge implies, any more than they would say that the "plain man" is already a metaphysician. But they hold that reflection on experience shows that self-reference, or reference