On the Ethics of NaturalismSorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Philosophy
On the Ethics of Naturalism
Sorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Ethics; Ethics, Evolutionary
This view receives confirmation from the way in which utilitarianism
is held by the most eminent of living moralists. In the 'Methods
of Ethics,' the tradition of Bentham is expressly united with the
doctrines of Butler and Clarke. Professor Sidgwick agrees with
Bentham, and the long line of moralists from Epicurus downwards,
in maintaining the doctrine of ethical hedonism, that pleasure is
the only thing ultimately desirable; but, with Butler, he rejects
the psychological hedonism, according to which pleasure is the only
object of desire. So far from these two positions being inconsistent,
it is only through the second that the first can be held in its
universalistic form. The problem is, however, how to unite them. In
Professor Sidgwick's theory, they are connected by the application
of the ethical maxims of benevolence and equity, which an exhaustive
examination of ethical intuitions has left standing as axioms of
the practical reason. Though utilitarianism, therefore, is still
adhered to, it is on an expressly Rational ground, not on the basis
of Naturalism.
* * * * *
[Sidenote: 7. Summary of ethical consequences of psychological
hedonism:]
In this and the previous chapter, I have looked at human nature from
the point of view of psychological hedonism, and have endeavoured to
show what ethical principles that theory leads to, or is consistent
with. The theory does not deny that there is a great diversity
of capacities and interests in man. But it holds that, so far as
concerns conduct, they admit of being brought under one general
law--that every action is subject to the rule of the "two sovereign
masters, pleasure and pain." It is evident, therefore, that if ethics
is to be connected at all with psychology--if what ought to be
done is in any degree what can be done--the end of conduct must be
hedonistic. The psychological fact cannot indeed be without more ado
turned into a moral imperative. Yet this much may be admitted, that
if this interpretation of action leaves room for ethics at all, the
end prescribed can be nothing else than pleasure, or the avoidance of
pain.
[Sidenote: (_a_) no logical connection with utilitarianism;]
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