On the Ethics of NaturalismSorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Philosophy
On the Ethics of Naturalism
Sorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Ethics; Ethics, Evolutionary
The question, therefore, was how to determine the pleasure which
is to be sought? And I have tried to show, in the chapter just
concluded, that utilitarianism does not admit of being logically
arrived at from this point of view. It may indeed, under certain
circumstances,[67] be the guide of political or social enactments;
but these can only be made to bear upon the conduct of individuals
by the sanctions which the State or Society has at its command. The
individual can have as his maxim of conduct an end which corresponds
with utilitarianism in two events only: when he is so constituted
as to find his pleasure in the greatest aggregate pleasure of
mankind, or when the political and social sanctions are so complete
and searching as to make his individual interest and the collective
interest coincide. The former event is unfortunately too rare to be
taken into account in establishing a theory; the latter would imply
an interference with individual liberty so impracticable that it
is not contemplated even in the most comprehensive of socialistic
schemes.
[Sidenote: (_b_) admits of rational egoism]
[Sidenote: only under impossible conditions.]
Hedonism in psychology, therefore, means egoism in ethics. But
even this theory, as the previous chapter has shown, has its own
difficulties to meet. The antagonism of individual and universal has
not yet been got rid of. The difficulty is no longer caused by the
conflict between one man and his neighbours: it is the difference
between the feeling and action of a moment, and the sum of feelings
and actions which makes up a lifetime. It is true that, if we
admit that pleasure is the only thing worth pursuing, and that by
"pleasure" a man means "his own pleasure," there is so far no reason
for preferring the pleasure of one moment to that of another, except
as more certain or of greater amount or degree;[68] but this is to
start with ascribing a value to pleasure, and not with the simple
fact that pleasure is desired. If psychological hedonism is our
starting-point--and we give to the theory the interpretation that
has the greatest verisimilitude--it is the greatest present pleasure
that rules. And, although the man of reflection will no doubt attempt
to estimate the future pleasure at its true value in comparison
with the pleasure actually present, this can never have full effect
upon his will. It has been shown, indeed, that the realisation of
egoistic hedonism is not merely unattainable from the point of view
of psychological hedonism, but that it would involve conditions
inconsistent with the nature of desire.
FOOTNOTES:
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account