and social interests, and thus to have removed the obstacles in the way of founding morality on the basis of Naturalism. It is, therefore, of importance to examine with care the ethical bearings of the theory of evolution. FOOTNOTES: [69] "The very idea of an interested pursuit necessarily presupposes particular passions or appetites; since the very idea of interest or happiness consists in this, that an appetite or affection enjoys its object."--Sermons, Pref.; cf. Serm. xi. [70] Phil., 31 ff.; cf. Gorg., 495 f.; Rep., ix. 585. [71] Cf. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, I. iv. 2, 3d ed., p. 44. [72] Herbart, Psychologie als Wissenschaft, § 104, Werke, vi. 74; cf. Waitz, Lehrbuch der Psychologie als Naturwissenschaft, § 40, p. 418: "It is not difficult to recognise the basis of desire in the presentations brought forward by reproduction, and, at the same time, held back by an inhibition." [73] With Herbart's doctrine may be compared Mr H. Spencer's view of the genesis of feeling and voluntary action, Principles of Psychology, 2d ed., part iv. chaps. viii. and ix. [74] Cf. note to James Mill's Analysis, ii. 383 f. [75] The Senses and the Intellect, 3d ed., p. 344; cf. Mental and Moral Science, pp. 90, 91. [76] "If there be any principles or affections in the mind of man distinct from self-love, that the things those principles tend towards, or the objects of those affections are, each of them in themselves eligible to be pursued upon its own account, and to be rested in as an end, is implied in the very idea of such principle or affection."--Butler, Sermons, Pref. [77] Inquiry concerning Virtue, II. i. 3. [78] Ibid., II. ii., conclusion. [79] System of Moral Philosophy, i. 99. [80] Sermons, xi. [81] Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre (1803), p. 54. [82] Inquiry, II. i. 3. [83] Inquiry, II. i. 3; II. ii. 2. [84] Ibid., II. i. 1. [85] "What is Reason but that sagacity we have in prosecuting any end? The ultimate end proposed by the common moralists is the happiness of the agent himself, and this certainly he is determined to pursue from instinct. Now may not another instinct towards the public, or the good of others, be as proper a principle of virtue as the instinct toward private happiness?"--Hutcheson, Inquiry, p. 115. [86] Cf. System, i. 97; Inquiry, p. 124. [87] Inquiry, p. 124. [88] Ibid., p. 106. [89] Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense (1728), p. xix. [90] Cf. Inquiry, p. 140 ff. [91] Introduction to Moral Philosophy, translated from the Latin, 2d ed., 1753, p. 43; cf. Essay on the Passions and Affections, &c., p. 128. [92] System, i. 58. [93] System, i. 53. [94] Ibid., i. 59. [95] System, i. 59. [96] System, i. 97. [97] System, i. 93. [98] System, i. 68 ff. With this may be compared the elaborate classification of motives, according to their moral quality, in Dr Martineau's 'Types of Ethical Theory,' ii. 176 ff. [99] System, i. 50.