On the Ethics of Naturalism

Name: On the Ethics of Naturalism
Author: Sorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)

Sorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)

Ethics; Ethics, Evolutionary

But as benevolence and sympathy widen, and become less closely
connected with a definite association of individuals, such as the
family or tribe, and there ceases to be a particular body to the
welfare of which these social feelings contribute, the operation of
the law of natural selection becomes less certain. This law only
tends to conserve and perfect the feelings in question, in virtue of
the fact that the associations to whose good they lead are successful
in the struggle for life over other associations the members of which
are not animated by like feelings. The one association lives and
expands, while the others are unable to maintain themselves against
the encroachments of their neighbours, and thus fall to pieces. The
law of natural selection, therefore, comes into play only when there
are competing organisms struggling against one another for the means
of subsistence and development. Not only is it the case, therefore,
that the sympathy which aids the weak who are unable to take care of
themselves, does not seem to be of the kind that would contribute
to success in the struggle for existence; but the more general and
catholic our sympathies are, the less will the law of evolution
help to preserve and develop them--because the less will they tend
to promote the welfare of one rival association rather than that of
another. Thus the growth of really unrestricted sympathy with men
as men cannot have been promoted in this way. The "enthusiasm of
humanity" which animated the early Christians, the self-renouncing
brotherhood of Buddha, the φιλανθρωπία (~philanthrôpia~) attributed
to men like Xenocrates[111] who had freed themselves from the
aristocratic prejudices of Athens, the "caritas generis humani" of
the Stoics,--such feelings as these could not have been encouraged,
any more than they could have been produced, by the operation of
natural selection. For, however much they tend to elevate the human
character, and to promote human happiness, they do not advance the
welfare of one body of men to the exclusion of some other competitor
in the struggle for existence.[112]

Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.

Opening the text

On the Ethics of NaturalismSorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)

Philosophy

On the Ethics of Naturalism

Sorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)

Ethics; Ethics, Evolutionary

But as benevolence and sympathy widen, and become less closely
connected with a definite association of individuals, such as the
family or tribe, and there ceases to be a particular body to the
welfare of which these social feelings contribute, the operation of
the law of natural selection becomes less certain. This law only
tends to conserve and perfect the feelings in question, in virtue of
the fact that the associations to whose good they lead are successful
in the struggle for life over other associations the members of which
are not animated by like feelings. The one association lives and
expands, while the others are unable to maintain themselves against
the encroachments of their neighbours, and thus fall to pieces. The
law of natural selection, therefore, comes into play only when there
are competing organisms struggling against one another for the means
of subsistence and development. Not only is it the case, therefore,
that the sympathy which aids the weak who are unable to take care of
themselves, does not seem to be of the kind that would contribute
to success in the struggle for existence; but the more general and
catholic our sympathies are, the less will the law of evolution
help to preserve and develop them--because the less will they tend
to promote the welfare of one rival association rather than that of
another. Thus the growth of really unrestricted sympathy with men
as men cannot have been promoted in this way. The "enthusiasm of
humanity" which animated the early Christians, the self-renouncing
brotherhood of Buddha, the φιλανθρωπία (~philanthrôpia~) attributed
to men like Xenocrates[111] who had freed themselves from the
aristocratic prejudices of Athens, the "caritas generis humani" of
the Stoics,--such feelings as these could not have been encouraged,
any more than they could have been produced, by the operation of
natural selection. For, however much they tend to elevate the human
character, and to promote human happiness, they do not advance the
welfare of one body of men to the exclusion of some other competitor
in the struggle for existence.[112]

Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.

On the Ethics of Naturalism

On the Ethics of Naturalism

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