[106] The social basis of ethics is emphasised by Professor Bain in his Practical Essays (1884), p. 155: "'How is society to be held together?' is the first consideration; and the sociologist--as constitution-builder, administrator, judge--is the person to grapple with the problem. It is with him that law, obligation, right, command, obedience, sanction, have their origin and their explanation. Ethics is an important supplement to social or political law. But it is still a department of law. In any other view it is a maze, a mystery, a hopeless embroilment." [107] Without denying that it is possible to apply the theory of evolution to mind, Professor Bain holds that, as a fact, moral sentiment has not become organic and hereditary--"that there are no moral instincts properly so called."--The Emotions and the Will, 3d ed., p. 56. [108] First Principles, 4th ed., p. 380. [109] Science of Ethics, p. vi. [110] It would seem that the transmission of mental qualities only takes place in the form of modified physical structure (cf. G. H. Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind, 1st series, i. 164). But, if we regard it as established that every mental change has a structural modification corresponding to it, the possibility of mental evolution and inheritance presents no new difficulty. [111] Ælian, V. H., xiii. 30. [112] If conscience has no other function than that assigned to it by Clifford, Lectures and Essay, ii. 169, "the preservation of society in the struggle for existence," then it can never reach universal benevolence or prescribe "duties towards all mankind." [113] A difficulty of another kind is suggested by Professor Bain, who holds that the "pleasure of malevolence" is not only a real element in the human constitution, but greater than would be naturally called forth by the conditions and course of development. "It is remarked by Mr Spencer," he says, "that it was necessary for the progress of the race that destructive activity should not be painful, but on the whole pleasurable. In point of fact, however, the pleasure of destruction has gone much beyond what these words express, and much beyond what is advantageous to the collective interest of animals and of human beings alike. The positive delight in suffering has been at all stages too great."--The Emotions and the Will, p. 66. So far from adopting this argument, however, I must confess myself still amongst the unconvinced regarding the "pleasure of malevolence." [114] This subject is carefully discussed in Mr Stephen's 'Science of Ethics.' CHAPTER VI. EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. [Sidenote: Bearing of the theory of evolution on previous ethical theories.]