On the Ethics of NaturalismSorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Philosophy
On the Ethics of Naturalism
Sorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Ethics; Ethics, Evolutionary
The evolutionist will therefore contend that different degrees
of value for the regulation of conduct belong to different
moral intuitions or classes of them. If one class is habitually
disregarded, he may assert that historical evidence goes to show
that society will fall to pieces, and the life of man become, in
the expressive words of Hobbes, "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and
short." The disregard of another class will probably lead to a more
precarious existence, or one less filled with the experiences which
make up life; while opposition to a third class, so far from being
hurtful or dangerous, may remove unnecessary restrictions, and aid
the development both of the individual and of society.
[Sidenote: (_b_) their organic character.]
(_b_) There is a second point which will also be recognised by the
evolutionist. Although these intuitions have been derived, they
are now organic, and their disappearance from the human mind as
instinctive tendencies towards or against action can only be slow
and painful. The process must involve a certain amount of loss: at
the same time, it is not a process that can be easily avoided. As
soon as the reason of the instinctive tendency is inquired into, it
is weakened as instinct. We pass from the action itself to the end
it is fitted to subserve; and, if the instinctive action is not the
most appropriate, or has hurtful results, we have already reached the
stage in which the instinct is checked, and begins to yield to action
directed by a principle. Yet it dies out only gradually, and, so to
speak, after a struggle. Nor does it seem possible to assert with
confidence, as mitigating this struggle, that the strongest impulses
will always be those which are necessary or advantageous to the
existence of society. For it is a common experience that the moral
intuitions which lead to conduct that has ceased to serve a purpose,
and the internal sanctions which follow disregard of them, are often
even more powerful than those which protect such virtues as justice
or veracity.
[Sidenote: Resultant attitude of evolutionism to intuitionism.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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