On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and On the Will in Nature: Two Essays (revised edition)Schopenhauer, Arthur
Philosophy
On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and On the Will in Nature: Two Essays (revised edition)
Schopenhauer, Arthur
Sufficient reason; Will
It is not upon causality proper, but upon the identity of the knowing
with the willing Subject, as shown in § 42, that the influence is
based, which the will exercises over the intellect, when it obliges
it to repeat representations that have once been present to it,
and in general to turn its attention in this or that direction and
evoke at pleasure any particular series of thoughts. And even in
this, the will is determined by the law of motives, in accordance
with which it also secretly rules what is called the association of
ideas, to which I have devoted a separate chapter (the 14th) in the
second volume of my chief work. This association of ideas is itself
nothing but the application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
in its four forms to the subjective train of thought; that is, to
the presence of representations in our consciousness. But it is the
will of the individual that sets the whole mechanism in motion, by
urging the intellect, in accordance with the interest, _i.e._, the
individual aims, of the person, to recall, together with its present
representations, those which either logically or analogically, or by
proximity in Time or Space, are nearly related to them. The will's
activity in this, however, is so immediate, that in most cases we
have no clear consciousness of it; and so rapid, that we are at
times even unconscious of the occasion which has thus called forth a
representation. In such cases, it appears as if something had come into
our consciousness quite independently of all connection with anything
else; that this, however, is impossible, is precisely the Root of the
Principle of Sufficient Reason, which has been fully explained in the
above-mentioned chapter of my chief work.[155] Every picture which
suddenly presents itself to our imagination, every judgment even that
does not follow its previously present reason, must be called forth
by an act of volition having a motive; although that motive may often
escape our perception owing to its insignificance, and although such
acts of volition are often in like manner unperceived, because they
take place so easily, that wish and fulfilment are simultaneous.
[155] See "Die Welt, a. W. u. V." vol. ii. ch. xiv.
§ 45. _Memory._
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