On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and On the Will in Nature: Two Essays (revised edition)Schopenhauer, Arthur
Philosophy
On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and On the Will in Nature: Two Essays (revised edition)
Schopenhauer, Arthur
Sufficient reason; Will
The following is my objection against this promiscuous employment of
the word _ground_ (reason) and, with it, of the Principle of Sufficient
Reason in general; it is likewise the second result, intimately
connected with the first, which the present treatise gives concerning
its subject-matter proper. The four laws of our cognitive faculty, of
which the Principle of Sufficient Reason is the common expression, by
their common character as well as by the fact that all Objects for the
Subject are divided amongst them, proclaim themselves to be posited by
one and the same primary quality and inner peculiarity of our knowing
faculty, which faculty manifests itself as Sensibility, Understanding,
and Reason. Therefore, even if we imagined it to be possible for a new
Fifth Class of Objects to come about, we should in that case likewise
have to assume that the Principle of Sufficient Reason would appear
in this class also under a different form. Notwithstanding all this,
we still have no right to talk of an _absolute reason_ (ground), nor
does a _reason in general_, any more than a _triangle in general_,
exist otherwise than as a conception derived by means of discursive
reflection, nor is this conception, as a representation drawn from
other representations, anything more than a means of thinking several
things in one. Now, just as every triangle must be either acute-angled,
right-angled, or obtuse-angled, and either equilateral, isosceles
or scalene, so also must every reason belong to one or other of the
four possible kinds of reasons I have pointed out. Moreover, since we
have only four well-distinguished Classes of Objects, every reason
must also belong to one or other of these four, and no further Class
being possible, Reason itself is forced to rank it within them; for as
soon as we employ a reason, we presuppose the Four Classes as well as
the faculty of representing (_i.e._ the whole world), and must hold
ourselves within these bounds, never transcending them. Should others,
however, see this in a different light and opine that a _reason in
general_ is anything but a conception, derived from the four kinds of
reasons, which expresses what they all have in common, we might revive
the controversy of the Realists and Nominalists, and then I should side
with the latter.
ON THE WILL IN NATURE.
AN ACCOUNT OF THE CORROBORATIONS RECEIVED BY THE AUTHOR'S PHILOSOPHY
SINCE ITS FIRST APPEARANCE
FROM THE EMPIRICAL SCIENCES.
BY
ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.
_Translated from the Fourth Edition published by_ JULIUS FRAUENSTÄDT.
Τοιαῦτ' ἐμοῦ λόγοισιν ἐξηγουμένου,
Οὐκ ἠξίωσαν οὐδὲ προσβλέψαι τὸ πᾶν·
Ἀλλ' ἐκδιδάσκει πάνθ' ὁ γηράσκων χρόνος.
ÆSCH.
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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