untenable. It was superseded by Haller's Irritability and Sensibility, which, to be sure, are taken in a purely empirical sense, but, to make up for this, are also two _qualitates occultæ_, at which all explanation ceases. The movement of the heart and of the intestines was now attributed to Irritability. But the _anima rationalis_ still remained in undiminished honour and dignity as a visitor at the house of the body.[198]--"Truth lies at the bottom of a well," said Democritus; and the centuries with a sigh, have repeated his words. But small wonder, if it gets a rap on the knuckles as soon as it tries to come out! [197] As a being existing by itself, a thing in itself. [Add. to 3rd ed.] [198] In which it is lodged in the garret. [Add. to 3rd ed.] The fundamental truth of my doctrine, which places that doctrine in opposition with all others that have ever existed, is the complete separation between the will and the intellect, which all philosophers before me had looked upon as inseparable; or rather, I ought to say that they had regarded the will as conditioned by, nay, mostly even as a mere function of, the intellect, assumed by them to be the fundamental substance of our spiritual being. But this separation, this analysis into two heterogeneous elements, of the _ego_ or _soul_, which had so long been deemed an indivisible unity, is, for philosophy, what the analysis of water has been for chemistry, though it may take time to be acknowledged. With me, that which is eternal and indestructible in man, therefore, that which constitutes his vital principle, is not _the soul_, but--if I may use a chemical term--its radical: and this is _the will_. The so-called soul is already a compound: it is the union of the will and the intellect (νούς). This intellect is the secondary element, the _posterius_ of the organism and, as a mere cerebral function, is conditioned by the organism; whereas the will is what is primary, the _prius_ of the organism, which is conditioned by it. For the will is that thing in itself, which only becomes apparent as an organic body in our representation (that mere function of the brain): it is only through the forms of knowledge (or cerebral function), that is, only in our representation--not apart from that representation, not immediately in our self-consciousness--that our body is given to each of us as a thing which has extension, limbs and organs. As the actions of our body are only acts of volition portraying themselves in representation, so likewise is their substratum, the shape of that body, in the main the portrait of the will: so that, in all the organic functions of our body, the will is just as much the _agent_ as in its external actions. True Physiology, at its highest, shows the spiritual (the intellectual) in man to be the product of the physical in him, and no one has done this so thoroughly as Cabanis; but true Metaphysic teaches us, that the physical in man is itself mere product, or rather