On the Genesis of SpeciesMivart, St. George Jackson
Religion
On the Genesis of Species
Mivart, St. George Jackson
Evolution (Biology)
We have thus (1) direct or supernatural action; (2) physical action; and
(3) hyperphysical action---the two latter both belonging to the order of
nature.[258] Neither the physical nor the hyperphysical actions, however,
exclude the idea of the Divine concurrence, and with every consistent
theist that idea is necessarily included. Dr. Asa Gray has given expression
to this.[259] He says, "Agreeing that plants and animals were produced by
Omnipotent fiat, does not exclude the idea of natural order and what we
call secondary causes. The record of the fiat--'Let the earth bring forth
grass, the herb yielding seed,' &c., 'let the earth bring forth the living
creature after his kind'--seems even to imply them," and leads to the
conclusion that the various kinds were produced through natural agencies.
{254}
Now, much confusion has arisen from not keeping clearly in view this
distinction between _absolute_ creation and _derivative_ creation. With the
first, physical science has plainly nothing whatever to do, and is impotent
to prove or to refute it. The second is also safe from any attack on the
part of physical science, for it is primarily derived from psychical not
physical phenomena. The greater part of the apparent force possessed by
objectors to creation, like Mr. Darwin, lies in their treating the
assertion of derivative creation as if it was an assertion of absolute
creation, or at least of supernatural action. Thus, he asks whether some of
his opponents believe "that at innumerable periods in the earth's history,
certain elemental atoms have been commanded suddenly to flash into living
tissues."[260] Certain of Mr. Darwin's objections, however, are not
physical, but _metaphysical_, and really attack the dogma of secondary or
derivative creation, though to some perhaps they may appear to be directed
against absolute creation only.
Thus he uses, as an illustration, the conception of a man who builds an
edifice from fragments of rock at the base of a precipice, by selecting for
the construction of the various parts of the building the pieces which are
the most suitable owing to the shape they happen to have broken into.
Afterwards, alluding to this illustration, he says,[261] "The shape of the
fragments of stone at the base of our precipice may be called accidental,
but this is not strictly correct, for the shape of each depends on a long
sequence of events, all obeying natural laws, on the nature of the rock, on
the lines of stratification or cleavage, on the form of the mountain which
depends on its upheaval and subsequent denudation, and lastly, on the storm
and earthquake which threw down the fragments. But in regard to the use to
which the fragments may be put, their shape may strictly be said to be{255}
accidental. And here we are led to face a great difficulty, in alluding to
which I am aware that I am travelling beyond my proper province."
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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