As regards the relations which the diplomatist maintains in a foreign country, we must observe that while his success will partly depend upon his affability to all men, he must use the utmost discretion in all his more intimate relationships, and, above all, he should try to form professional friendships on the basis of mutual advantage and respect. There is no permanence in a relationship begun by promises which cannot be redeemed, and therefore, as I have said before, the use of deceit in diplomacy is of necessity restricted, for there is no curse which comes quicker to roost than a lie which has been found out. Beyond the fact that a lie is unworthy of a great minister, it actually does more harm than good to policy because, though it may confer success to-day, it will create an atmosphere of suspicion which will make success impossible to-morrow. No doubt an ambassador will receive a great deal of information which it is his duty to transmit; but if he is not in a position to test it he will merely pass it on without comment or guarantee of its truth. In general it should be the highest aim of the diplomatist to gain such a reputation for good faith with his own government and also abroad that they will place reliance both upon his information and upon the advice which he gives. [Sidenote: _The Value of a Candid Report._] In this respect he should take good care in reporting the course of negotiations to his master from time to time not to hold out prospects of success before success itself is in his grasp. It is much better that he should depict the difficulties of the case and the improbability of success even when he is virtually sure in his own mind that he will succeed. He will acquire vastly greater credit by success in an undertaking of which he himself promises little than he will in one upon which he has reported favourably throughout. It is always good for the credit of a negotiator if good reports of him arrive from different sources, for such independent proof of the value of a diplomatist’s services must be highly prized by every prince, and will redound to the benefit of the diplomatist himself. It is obvious that the more successful he is in the relationships which he forms at a foreign court, the more surely will the diplomatist receive such independent testimony to his merit. But let him not seek such testimony by unworthy means. For this purpose he should neither bribe the servants of others, nor take natives of a foreign court into his own service. It is too obvious that they will probably be spies. [Sidenote: _On Accepting Gifts._]