"The former path," he adds[172], "that of illicit and hasty generalization, is one which the intellect follows when abandoned to its own impulse; and this it does from the requisitions of logic. For the mind has a yearning which makes it dart forth to generalities, that it may have something to rest in; and after a little dallying with experience, becomes weary of it; and all these evils are augmented by logic, which requires these generalities to make a show with in its disputations." "In a sober, patient, grave intellect," he further adds, "the mind, by its own impulse, (and more especially if it be not impelled by the sway of established opinions) attempts in some measure that other and true way, of gradual generalization; but this it does with small profit; for the intellect, except it be regulated and aided, is a faculty of unequal operation, and altogether unapt to master the obscurity of things." The profound and searching wisdom of these remarks appears more and more, as we apply them to the various attempts which men have made to obtain knowledge; when they begin with the contemplation of a few facts, and pursue their speculations, as upon most subjects they have hitherto generally done; for almost all such attempts have led immediately to some process of illicit generalization, which introduces an interminable course of controversy. In the physical sciences, however, we have the further inestimable advantage of seeing the other side of the contrast exemplified: for many of them, as our inductive Tables show us, have gone on according to the most rigorous conditions of gradual and successive generalization; and in consequence of this circumstance in their constitution, possess, in each part of their structure, a solid truth, which is always ready to stand the severest tests of reasoning and experiment. We see how justly and clearly Bacon judged concerning the mode in which facts are to be employed in the construction of science. This, indeed, has ever been deemed his great merit: insomuch that many persons appear to apprehend the main substance of his doctrine to reside in the maxim that facts of observation, and such facts alone, are the essential elements of all true science. (V.) 10. _Ideas are necessary._--Yet we have endeavoured to establish the doctrine that facts are but one of two ingredients of knowledge both equally necessary;--that _Ideas_ are no less indispensable than facts themselves; and that except these be duly unfolded and applied, facts are collected in vain. Has Bacon then neglected this great portion of his subject? Has he been led by some partiality of view, or some peculiarity of circumstances, to leave this curious and essential element of science in its pristine obscurity? Was he unaware of its interest and importance?