[Footnote 279: There are some points in my doctrines on the subject of the Classificatory Sciences to which Mr. Mill objects, (ii. 314, &c.), but there is nothing which I think it necessary to remark here, except one point. After speaking of Classification of organized beings in general, Mr. Mill notices (ii. 321) as an additional subject, the arrangement of natural groups into a Natural Series; and he says, that "all who have attempted a theory of natural arrangement, including among the rest Mr. Whewell, have stopped short of this: all except M. Comte." On this I have to observe, that I stopped short of, or rather passed by, the doctrine of a Series of organized beings, because I thought it bad and narrow philosophy: and that I sufficiently indicated that I did this. In the _History_ (b. xvi. c. vi.) I have spoken of the doctrine of Circular Progression propounded by Mr. Macleay, and have said, "so far as this view _negatives_ a mere _linear_ progression in nature, which would place each genus in contact with the preceding and succeeding ones, and so far as it requires us to attend to the more varied and ramified resemblances, there can be no doubt that it is supported by the result of all the attempts to form natural systems." And with regard to the difference between Cuvier and M. de Blainville, to which Mr. Mill refers (ii. 321), I certainly cannot think that M. Comte's suffrage can add any weight to the opinion of either of those great naturalists.] [Footnote 280: _Hist. Ind. Sc._ b. x. note (VA) in the second edition.] [Footnote 281: B. xi. c. v. art. 11.] [Footnote 282: I have given elsewhere (see last chapter) reasons why I cannot assign to M. Comte's _Philosophie Positive_ any great value as a contribution to the philosophy of science. In this judgment I conceive that I am supported by the best philosophers of our time. M. Comte owes, I think, much of the notice which has been given to him to his including, as Mr. Mill does, the science of society and of human nature in his scheme, and to his boldness in dealing with these. He appears to have been received with deference as a mathematician: but Sir John Herschel has shown that a supposed astronomical discovery of his is a mere assumption. I conceive that I have shown that his representation of the history of science is erroneous, both in its details and in its generalities. His distinction of the three stages of sciences, the theological, metaphysical, and positive, is not at all supported by the facts of scientific history. Real discoveries always involve what he calls _metaphysics_; and the doctrine of final causes in physiology, the main element of science which can properly be called _theological_, is retained at the end, as well as the beginning of the science, by all except a peculiar school.]