the disciples of the ancient schools, we may judge by the extraordinary
forms of defence in which they tried to intrench themselves. They would
not look through Galileo's glasses; they maintained that what was seen
was an illusion of witchcraft; and they tried, as Galileo says[151],
with logical arguments, as if with magical incantations, to charm the
new planets out of the sky. No one could be better fitted than Galileo
for such a warfare. His great knowledge, clear intellect, gaiety, and
light irony, (with the advantage of being in the right,) enabled him to
play with his adversaries as he pleased. Thus when an Aristotelian[152]
rejected the discovery of the irregularities in the moon's surface,
because, according to the ancient doctrine, her form was a perfect
sphere, and held that the apparent cavities were filled with an
invisible crystal substance, Galileo replied, that he had no objection
to assent to this, but that then he should require his adversary in
return to believe that there were on the same surface invisible crystal
mountains ten times as high as those visible ones which he had actually
observed and measured.
We find in Galileo many thoughts which have since become established
maxims of modern philosophy. "Philosophy," he says[153], "is written
in that great book, I mean the Universe, which is constantly open
before our eyes; but it cannot be understood, unless we first know the
language and learn the characters in which it is written." With this
thought he combines some other lively images. One of his interlocutors
says concerning another, "Sarsi perhaps thinks that philosophy is
a book made up of the fancies of men, like the _Iliad_ or _Orlando
Furioso_, in which the matter of least importance is, that what is
written be true." And again, with regard to the system of authority, he
says, "I think I discover in him a firm belief that, in philosophizing,
it is necessary to lean upon the opinion of some celebrated author;
as if our mind must necessarily remain unfruitful and barren till it
be married to another man's reason."--"No," he says, "the case is not
so.--When we have the decrees of Nature, authority goes for nothing;
reason is absolute[154]."
In the course of Galileo's controversies, questions of the logic of
science came under discussion. Vincenzio di Grazia objected to a proof
from induction which Galileo adduced, because _all_ the particulars
were not enumerated; to which the latter justly replies[155], that
if induction were required to pass through all the cases, it would
be either useless or impossible;--impossible when the cases are
innumerable; useless when they have each already been verified, since
then the general proposition adds nothing to our knowledge.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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