An army of 200,000 men in ten divisions, the divisions composed of five
brigades each, would give brigades 4,000 strong. We see here no
disproportion. Certainly this army might also be divided into five
corps, the corps into four divisions, and the division into four
brigades, which makes the brigade 2,500 men strong; but the first
distribution, looked at in the abstract, appears to us preferable, for
besides that, in the other, there is one more gradation of rank, five
parts are too few to make an army manageable; four divisions, in like
manner, are too few for a corps, and 2,500 men is a weak brigade, of
which, in this manner, there are eighty, whereas the first formation
has only fifty, and is therefore simpler. All these advantages are
given up merely for the sake of having only to send orders to half as
many generals. Of course the distribution into corps is still more
unsuitable for smaller armies.
This is the abstract view of the case. The particular case may present
good reasons for deciding otherwise. Likewise, we must admit that,
although eight or ten divisions may be directed when united in a level
country, in widely extended mountain positions the thing might perhaps
be impossible. A great river which divides an army into halves, makes a
commander for each half indispensable; in short, there are a hundred
local and particular objects of the most decisive character, before
which all rules must give way.
But still, experience teaches us, that these abstract grounds come most
frequently into use and are seldomer overruled by others than we should
perhaps suppose.
We wish further to explain clearly the scope of the foregoing
considerations by a simple outline, for which purpose we now place the
different points of most importance next to each other.
As we mean by the term numbers, or parts of a whole, only those which
are made by the primary, therefore the immediate division, we say.
1. If a whole has too few members it is unwieldy.
2. If the parts of a whole body are too large, the power of the
superior will is thereby weakened.
3. With every additional step through which an order has to pass, it is
weakened in two ways: in one way by the loss of force, which it suffers
in its passage through an additional step; in another way by the longer
time in its transmission.
The tendency of all this is to show that the number of co-ordinate
divisions should be as great, and the gradational steps as few as
possible; and the only limitation to this conclusion is, that in armies
no more than from eight to ten, and in subordinate corps no more than
from four or at most six, subdivisions can be conveniently directed.
2.—Combination of Arms.
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