In strategy there is no victory, as we have before said. On the one hand, the strategic success is the successful preparation of the tactical victory; the greater this strategic success, the more probable becomes the victory in the battle. On the other hand, strategic success lies in the making use of the victory gained. The more events the strategic combinations can in the sequel include in the consequences of a battle gained, the more strategy can lay hands on amongst the wreck of all that has been shaken to the foundation by the battle, the more it sweeps up in great masses what of necessity has been gained with great labour by many single hands in the battle, the grander will be its success.—Those things which chiefly lead to this success, or at least facilitate it, consequently the leading principles of efficient action in strategy, are as follow:— 1. The advantage of ground. 2. The surprise, let it be either in the form of an actual attack by surprise or by the unexpected display of large forces at certain points. 3. The attack from several quarters (all three, as in tactics). 4. The assistance of the theatre of war by fortresses, and everything belonging to them. 5. The support of the people. 6. The utilisation of great moral forces. Now, what are the relations of offensive and defensive with respect to these things? The party on the defensive has the advantage of ground; the offensive side that of the attack by surprise in strategy, as in tactics But respecting the surprise, we must observe that it is infinitely more efficacious and important in strategy than in tactics. In the latter, a surprise seldom rises to the level of a great victory, while in strategy it often finishes the war at one stroke. But at the same time we must observe that the advantageous use of this means supposes some _great_ and _uncommon_, as well as _decisive_ error committed by the adversary, therefore it does not alter the balance much in favour of the offensive.