Ontology, or the Theory of BeingCoffey, P. (Peter)
Philosophy
Ontology, or the Theory of Being
Coffey, P. (Peter)
Ontology
We have seen already that the _concepts_ of essence and existence are
distinct from each other (12, 13); in other words, that in all cases there
is at least a _logical_ distinction between the essence and the existence
of any being. We must, however, distinguish between created or contingent
beings and the Uncreated, Necessary, Self-Existent Being. The latter
exists _essentially_, eternally, by His own Essence, so that in Him
essence and existence are _really identical_. His essence is _formally_
His Existence; and, therefore, in thinking of His Essence we cannot
positively exclude the notion of existence or think of Him as
non-existent. The distinction between essence and existence, which we find
in our thoughts, is, therefore, when applied to God, a _purely logical_
distinction, due solely to our finite human mode of thinking, and having
no ground or basis or reason in the reality which is the object of our
thought. On this there is complete unanimity among scholastic
philosophers.
But while we conceive that God actually exists by that whereby He is God,
by His Essence Itself, we do not conceive that any created or contingent
being exists by that whereby it is what it is, by its essence. We do not,
for example, regard the essence of Socrates, whether specific or
individual (that whereby he is a _man_, or that whereby he is _this_ man,
Socrates), as that whereby he actually exists. In other words, the essence
of the existing Socrates, being a contingent essence, does not necessarily
demand or imply that it actually exist. Our concept of such an essence
does not include the note of actual existence. Therefore if we find such
an essence actually existing we consider this actually existing essence as
caused or produced, and conserved in existence, by some other being,
_viz._ by the Necessary Being: so that if it were not so created and
conserved it would be a pure possibility and nothing actual.(115) The same
difference between the Necessary Being and contingent beings will be seen
from considering their existence. The abstract concept of existence is
rendered definite and determinate by the essence which it actualizes. Now
every finite essence is of some particular kind; and its existence is
rendered determinate by the fact that it is the existence of a definite
kind of essence. The existence of a contingent being we conceive as the
actuality of its essence; and its essence as a definite potentiality of
existence. Thus if we conceive existence as a perfection it is restricted
by the finite nature of the potentiality which it actualizes. But the
existence of the Necessary Being is the plenitude of actuality, an
existence not restricted by being the existence of any essence that is
determinate because finite, but of an essence that is determinate by being
above all genera and species, by being infinite, by being Itself pure
actuality, in no sense potential but perfectly and formally identical with
actual existence.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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