Ontology, or the Theory of BeingCoffey, P. (Peter)
Philosophy
Ontology, or the Theory of Being
Coffey, P. (Peter)
Ontology
23. THE THEORY OF DISTINCTIONS IN ITS APPLICATION TO THE QUESTION.—In the
next place, what are we to understand by a _real_ distinction in this
matter? Ambiguity and obscurity of thought in regard to the theory of
_distinctions_, and in regard to the application of the theory to the
present question, has been probably the most fertile source of much
tedious and fruitless controversy in this connexion.
Anticipating what will be considered more fully at a later stage (30), we
must note here the two main classes of distinction which, by reflecting on
our thought-processes, we discover between the objects of our thought. The
_real_ distinction is that which exists in things independently of the
consideration of our minds; that which is discovered, but not made, by the
mind; that which is given to us in and with the data of our experience.
For example, the act of thinking is a reality other than, and therefore
_really_ distinct from, the mind that thinks; for the mind persists after
the act of thinking has passed away.
Opposed to this is the mental or logical distinction, which is the
distinction made by the mind itself between two different concepts of one
and the same reality; which is not in the reality independently of our
thought, but is introduced into it by our thought, regarding the same
reality under different aspects or from different points of view. The mind
never makes such a distinction without some ground or reason for doing so.
Sometimes, however, this reason will be found exclusively in the mind
itself—in the limitations of its modes of thought—and not in the reality
which is the matter or object of the thought. The distinction is then said
to be _purely_ logical or mental. Such distinctions are _entia rationis_,
logical entities. An example would be the distinction between the concept
“man” and the concept “rational animal,” or, in general, between any
definable object of thought and its definition; the distinction,
therefore, between the essence and the existence of the Necessary Being is
a purely logical distinction, for in a definition it is the essence of the
thing we define, and existence is of the essence or definition of the
Necessary Being.
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