There do not seem to be any other transcendental properties of being besides the three enumerated. The terms “reality,” “thing,” “something,” are synonymous expressions of the concept of being itself, rather than of properties of being. “Existence” is not a transcendental attribute of being, for it is not co-extensive with reality or real being. And although reality _must_ be “_either_ possible _or_ actual,” “_either_ necessary _or_ contingent,” “_either_ infinite _or_ finite,” etc., this necessity of verifying in itself one or other member of any such alternatives is not a property of being, but rather something essentially rooted in the very concept of reality itself. Some would regard as a distinct transcendental attribute of being the conception of the latter as an object of esthetic contemplation, as manifesting order and harmony, as _beautiful_. This conception of being will be found, however, to flow from the more fundamental aspects of reality considered as _true_ and as _good_, rather than directly from the concept of being itself. 26. TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY.—When we think of anything as one we think of it as undivided in itself. The unity or oneness of being is the undividedness of being: _Unum est id quod est indivisum in se: Universaliter quaecunque non habent divisionem, inquantum non habent, sic unum dicuntur_.(133) When, therefore, we conceive being as undivided into constitutive parts, and unmultiplied into repetitions of itself, we conceive it as _a_ being, as _one_. For the concept of being, formally as one, it does not seem necessary that we conceive being as _divided or distinct from all other being_. This second negation, of identity with other being, rather follows the conception of being as one: being is distinct from other being because it is already itself one: it is a prior negation that formally constitutes its unity, namely, _the negation of internal division or multiplication of itself_: God was truly _one_ from all eternity, before there was any _other_ being, any created being, distinct from Him. The division or distinction of an object of thought from whatever is not itself is what constitutes the notion of _otherness_.(134) It is manifest that being and unity are really identical, that when we think of being we think of what is really undivided in itself, that once we introduce dividedness into the object of our concept we are no longer thinking of being but of _beings_, _i.e._ of a multitude or plurality each member of which is a _being_ and _one_. For being, as an object of thought, is either simple or composite. If simple, it is not only undivided but indivisible. If composite, we cannot think of it as _a_ being, capable of existing, so long as we think its parts as separate or divided: only when we think of them as actually united and undivided have we the concept of _a_ being: and _eo ipso_ we have the concept of being as one, as a unity.(135)