36. LOGICAL DISTINCTIONS AND THEIR GROUNDS.—The purely logical distinction must not be confounded with a mere _verbal_ distinction, _e.g._ that between an “edifice” and a “building,” or between “truthfulness” and “veracity”. A logical distinction is a distinction _in the concepts_: these must represent one and the same reality but in different ways: the one may be more explicit, more fully analysed than the other, as a definition is in comparison with the thought-object defined; or the one may represent the object less adequately than the other, as when we compare (in intension) the concepts “man” and “animal”; or the one may be predicated of the other in an affirmative judgment; or the one may represent the object as concrete and individual, the other the same object as abstract and universal.(153) Comparing, in the next place, the purely logical with the virtual distinction, we see that the grounds for making these distinctions are different. Every distinction made by the mind must have an intelligible ground or reason of some sort—a _fundamentum distinctionis_. Now in the case of the purely logical distinction the ground is understood to consist exclusively in the needs of the mind itself—needs which spring from the mind’s own limitations when confronted with the task of understanding or interpreting reality, of making reality intelligible. Purely logical distinctions are therefore seen to be a class of purely logical relations, _i.e._ of those _entia rationis_ which the mind must construct for itself in its effort to understand the real. They have no other reality as objects of thought than the reality they derive from the constitutive or constructive activity of the mind. They are modes, or forms, or terms, of the cognitive activity itself, not of the reality which is the object apprehended and contemplated by means of this cognitive activity.