48. THE GOOD, THE REAL, AND THE ACTUAL.—Having compared “perfection” with “goodness” and with “being,” let us next compare the two latter notions with each other. We shall see presently that every actual being has its ontological goodness, that these are in reality identical. But there is a logical distinction between them. In the first place the term “being” is applied _par excellence_ to substances rather than to accidents. But we do not commonly speak of an individual substance, a person or thing, as good in reference to essential or substantial perfection.(178) When we describe a man, or a machine, as “good,” we mean that the man possesses those _accidental_ perfections, those qualities and endowments, which are suitable to his nature as a man; that the machine possesses those properties which adapt it to its end. In the second place the notion of being is absolute; that of the good is relative, for it implies the notion not of reality simply but of reality as desirable, agreeable, suitable, as perfecting the nature of a subject, as being the end, or conducive to the end, towards which this nature tends. And since what thus _perfects_ must be something not potential but actual, it follows that, unlike real truth, real goodness is identical not with potential, but only with actual reality. It is not an attribute of the abstract, possible essence, but only of the concrete, actually existing essence.(179) From the fact that the notion of the good is relative it follows that the same thing can be simultaneously good and bad in different relations: “What is one man’s meat is another man’s poison”. 49. KINDS OF GOODNESS; DIVISIONS OF THE GOOD.—(_a_) The goodness of a being may be considered in relation to this being itself, or to other beings. What is good for a being itself, what makes it intrinsically and formally good, _bonum sibi_, is whatever perfects it, and in the fullest sense the realization of its end. Hence we speak of a virtuous, upright man, whose conduct is in keeping with his nature and conducive to the realization of his end, as a good man. But a being may also be good to others, _bonum alteri_, by an extrinsic, active, effective goodness, inasmuch as by its action it may help other beings in the realization of their ends. In this sense, a beneficent man, who wishes the well-being of his fellow-men and helps them to realize this well-being, is called a good man. This kind of goodness is what is often nowadays styled _philanthropy_; in Christian ethics it is known as _charity_.